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INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 1975, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, a major
vendor of nuclear reactors and a major contractor for uranium fuel,
announced that it would not honor fixed price contracts to deliver
nearly 70 million pounds of uranium. Westinghouse claimed that it was
not legally bound to honor these contracts by appealing to the rarely
used section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which allows
excuse from the performance of contractual obligations for reasons of
"commercial impracticability". In particular that for "unforeseeable"
reasons uranium prices had risen to levels several times those at which
Westinghouse had agreed to deliver uranium to utilities and that performance
2
on such sontracts, with a potential loss of as much as $1.5 billion, was
"commercial^ly impracticable". Subsequent to this announcement 16 utilities
in 13 separate actions sued Westinghouse in Federal Courts for breach of
3
contract. As of August 1976 these cases were still pending.
These events attracted my interest as an economist for a number of
reasons. First, that fixed priced long-term contracts might be legally
voided because the cost of performance had increased dramatically was
something that I had never seen discussed in the economics literature
and seemed to be in conflict with general presumptions about the sanctity
and enforceability of contracts. The implications of such a doctrine
seemed worth exploring in terms of its possible effects on resource
allocation. Second, the events surrounding Westinghouse 's actions,
4
my other ongoing work on the nuclear energy industry, and recent
theoretical research on pricing in natural resource markets suggested
to me that price formation in the uranium market was not well
2 -
understood. In addition since the uranium market was a relatively new
market with private buying and selling occurring only since 1968, it
appeared to be an ideal market to study for better understanding the
evolution of market institutions that lead to price adjustments in com-
petitive markets. Finally, the outcome of the Westinghouse case and
the possibility of many more cases like it could have important implications
for the effects of contract law on the process of voluntary exchange.
This paper attempts to deal with all three of these interests.
Section II of the paper discusses the legal doctrine of "impossibility"
and analyzes the effects of alternative interpretations on resource
allocation. Section III is an economic history of the post-war uranium
industry in the United States aimed at understanding the evolution of
feedback mechanisms or lack of such evolution which led to more or less
efficient market responses to changes in supply and demand configurations.
Sections II and III are for all intents and purposes independent of one
another and can be read as if they were separate papers. Section IV puts
the material in Section II and II together with regard to the specific
claims made by Westinghouse with an effort to both evaluate Westinghouse 's
contentions based on the law and economics and to discuss possible impli-
cations of the ultimate decisions of the courts.
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II. COMMERCIAL IMPOSSIBILITY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
An economy based on voluntary exchange can function without a system
of contract law. However, especially when we are dealing with exchanges
which involve delivery of the promised service or commodity over time
and/or payment for the service or commodity over time or where the
promised service or commodity is complicated, contract law can help to
facilitate voluntary exchange. Posner indicates that the law of con-
tracts can facilitate voluntary exchange in a number of important ways.
1. By protecting parties who perform in good faith from those
who do not, the law of contracts reduces the uncertainty of exchange
transactions and the costs associated with this uncertainty.
2. Contract law will reduce the costs of transactions directly by
setting up a set of normal terms applicable to transactions of a particular
type and therefore relieving the parties of the task and cost of negotiating
and specifying these terms in every transaction, "Good" contract law will
not try to override the inherent economics of exchange transactions by
requiring, for example, that it is the duty of the party with the higher
costs of inspecting goods to do so, because this will only increase trans-
actions' costs by leading to the specification of a clause shifting the
Q
burden back to the other party,
3. Contract law will serve as an aid to parties engaged in voluntary
exchange by providing them "...with information concerning the many con-
tingencies that may defeat an exchange, and hence to assist them in planning
9
their exchange sensibly,"
To this list I will also add the following function of contract law.
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4. To help to make voluntary exchanges more equitable by protecting
parties from signing objectively unfavorable contracts because of a gross
, . . , . . . . .
10inequality m bargaining position or ignorance.
Despite the lajmian's view of the "sanctity" of contracts there are
a variety of situations in which the terms of a contract may not be
enforceable. Of concern to us here are the particular situations in which
performance on a contract may be excused for reasons of "impossibility" or
"frustration". Before discussing the allocative significance of these
legal doctrines, let us examine their meaning in the context of the
evolution of these doctrines over time.
Prior to the middle of the 19th century, English common law required
absolute performance on a contract. Under the "rule of absolute liability"
a party to a contract who did not perform his obligaitons was liable for
damages even if such performance had been rendered impossible by events
which had occurred subsequent to negotiation and had not been stipulated
12
in the contract itself »- The rule requiring absolute performance was
13
first relaxed in 1863 in the case of Taylor vs. Caldwell . In this case
both parties to a contract for the rental of a music hall were excused
from performance when the music hall was destroyed by fire prior to the
date of performance even though this contingency had not
been specifically included in the contract. The court held that the
parties must have contemplated that the contract would only be honored if
the music hall ("some particular specified thing") continued to exist.
As a result the fact that performance would not be required if the music
hall burned down was an implied condition of the contract and the contractor
could be excused from performance for reasons of "impossibility of
performance"
.
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The English courts also developed a related concept whereby excuse
might be allowed when the purpose of the contract was "frustrated" by
events occurring subsequent to the time the contract was signed. In
14
Krell vs. Henry a party who had rented a room for the purpose of viewing
a coronation parade was released from having to pay for the room when the
parade was cancelled because the King became ill, even though the ability
to satisfy the "purpose" of the renter was not explicitly part of the
contract.
Both doctrines have been adopted and expanded by American courts,
A number of decisions by American courts have allowed somewhat weaker con-
ditions than strict impossibility as a qualification for excuse. In
Mineral Park the defendants contracted to haul sufficient sand and
gravel from the plaintiff's land to build a bridge. They agreed to pay
5(? per cubic yard for the sand and gravel taken from the property. The
defendants removed only part of the sand and gravel required for the pro-
ject from the plaintiff's land and acquired the rest elsewhere. The
plaintiff sued the defendant to pay him the contract price for the gravel
purchased elsewhere. The defendant claimed excuse because the rest of
the sand and gravel on the plaintiff's property was under water and the
cost of removing it would have been ten to twelve times the contract price.
The court accepted the defendant's contention on the ground that it was
"impracticable" for reasons of excessive and unreasonable cost.
Commercial impossibility and frustration are both discussed at some
length in the Restatement of Contracts C1932) . The authors of the
Restatement of Contracts seem to have favored discharge of performance
under conditions somewhat weaker than strict impossibility including also
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"...impracticability because of external and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury or loss involved". The Restatement provides a list of
situations in which performance should be excused. Among these are rules,
regulations and actions by the government which makes performance either
illegal or impossible, the destruction of things (like the music hall)
which makes performance impossible or impracticable, the illness of
individuals necessary for performance, and the non-existence of other
conditions, the existence of which is necessary for performance, which
were either expressly provided for or implied by the agreement of the
parties.
Frustration of purpose is discussed separately in the Restatement ,
"where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained
by either party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter
into it, and this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a
promisor who is without fault in causing the frustration, and who is harmed
thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing his promise unless a
„18
contrary intention appears.
Impossibility and frustration of purpose are normally discussed
19 20
together despite their separate treatment in the Restatement . Corbin
indicates that when a promisor is sued for non-performance there are three
basic kinds of defenses that he can set up.
1. He may assert that superseding events have made his own performance
impossible;
2. He may assert that performance of the agreed equivalent has become
impossible;
3. He may assert that the purpose for which he made the contract
has been frustrated.
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All these defenses assert that superseding events have made something
impossible. Corbin indicates that it is this common factor that leads to
21
the cases being discussed together. As indicated above, the common law
interpretation of "impossibility" (an absolute which rarely occurs in prac-
tice) has become gradually broader over time evolving more into a doctrine
22
of "impracticability". Exactly what is meant by "impossibility" has
important implication for contracting procedures and resource allocation
and appears to be sufficiently vague to lead to considerable variance in
23 24
practical application. Corbin does indicate, however, that under
common law, discharge may be granted when the costs of performance
have become extreme, but that this would be an
uncommon and extreme case. When the Uniform Commercial Code was written,
the authors appear to have adopted the somewhat weaker doctrine of "commer-
cial impracticability" rather than strict impossibility. According to
25
Hawkland, this relaxation in the doctrine of commercial impossibility
was largely an effort to give force majeur relief to small businessmen who
were not well represented and did not have the proper exemption clauses
written into their contracts. Despite the erosion of the doctrine of
strict or objective impossibility toward a doctrine of "commercial imprac-
ticability", UCC section 2-615 establishes a fairly strict set of conditions
for granting a discharge.
The party seeking to be discharged from his obligations under UCC 2-615
must show all of the following.
1. A failure of an underlying condition of the contract must occur. Part
(a) of UCC 2-615 reads:
"(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery ... is not a breach of his duty
- 8 -
under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made imprac-
ticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was
a basic assumption made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable
foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later
proves to be invalid." (See also official comment 10 regarding govern-
ment laws , rules and regulations
.
)
2. The failure must have been unforeseen at the time the contract was
signed. Official comment 1 reads:
"This section excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods con-
tracted for, where his performance has become commercially impracticable
because of unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contem-
plation of the parties at the time of contracting."
3. The risk of failure must not have been assumed either directly or
indirectly by the party seeking excuse. Official comment 8 indicates that
"The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of
greater liability by agreement and such agreement is to be formed not only
in the expressed terms of the contract but in the circumstances surrounding
the contracting, in trade usage and the like. Thus the exemptions of this
section do not apply when the contingency in question is sufficiently fore-
shadowed at the time of contracting to be included among the business risks
which are fairly to be regarded as part of the dickered terms, either con-
sciously or as a matter of reasonable, commercial interpretation from the
circumstances .
"
Comment 8 also raises the question of whether requirement 2 above
really means "unforeseen" or "unforeseeable". The latter is a much stronger
requirement than the former. In Lloyd vs. Murphy the court appears to
- 9 -
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adopt a common law doctrine of unforeseeabillty. Hurst appears to accept
this view, questions the wisdom of this requirement and suggests
28
that the requirement is probably not controlling . We might conclude at
this point that requirement 2 has been interpreted in prior common law and
academic thinking as being unforeseeable rather than merely unforeseen.
We will return to this issue below.
4. Performance must be impracticable. While relaxing the doctrine of
strict impossibility, the UCC appears to have replaced it with fairly
strict requirements for "impracticability". Official comment 4 states
that
:
"Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in
cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential
nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market
in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk
which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover. But
a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency
such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major
sources of supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in
cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to
his performance, is within the contemplation of this section."
The comment makes clear that increased cost alone is not sufficient;
rather that the increase must be "marked". In Mineral Park , discussed above,
a ten- to twelvefold increase was considered sufficient. The Restatement of
Contracts indicates that the increase should be "extreme and unreasonable"
and mentions a tenfold increase as illustrative of the kind of increase that
- 10 -
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might be sufficient. Hurst indicates that the courts have been reluctant
to allow excuse merely because the cost of performance has increased and the
30
contract become unprofitable. Courts have not allowed excuse in cases
arising directly under UCC 2-615 for cost increases of as much as a
31
doubling. It appears then that moderate increases in cost of up to 100
percent do not satisfy the requirement, while extreme increases of 1000
percent or more do. This leaves a considerable area for controversy.
Contracts will be enforced even if it hurts, but at some point between a
doubling and a tenfold increase in price the contract may become imprac-
ticable.
5. The seller must have made all reasonable attempts to assure himself
that the source of supply will not fail. Official comment 5 states
"There is no excuse under this section, however, unless the seller
has employed all due measures to assure himself that his source will not
fail."
Official comment 5 refers to a 1932 case, Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. Ltd
32
vs.. Dunbar Molasses Co. In this case a buyer sued a seller for failure
to deliver molasses that had been contracted for. The seller claimed that
its contract implied that it would only deliver if its exclusive source
of supply had sufficient production to meet its needs. It turned out that
this source of supply, a refinery, had cut its production and could not
meet the needs of the seller.
The court held that the contract was still binding; "There is nothing
to show that the defendant would have been unable by a timely contract
with the refinery to have assured itself of a supply sufficient to meet
its needs. The defendant does not even show that it tried to get a contract
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from the refinery during the months that intervened between the acceptance
of the plaintiff's order and the time when shipments were begun. It has
wholly failed to relieve itself of the imputation of contributory fault.
(3 Williston on Contracts Sec. 1959) So far as the record shows it put its
faith in the mere chance that the output of the refinery would be the same
from year to year, and finding its faith vain, it tells us that its customer
must have expected to take a chance as great. We see no reason for importing
into this bargain this aleatory element."
So it appears clear that both the official comment and the supporting
common law case indicate that the promisor must make all reasonable attempts
to avoid the failure of the underlying condition. In two cases handed down
under 2-615 the court has held that the seller did not qualify for excuse
if the failure to perform would not have occurred if the seller had proceeded
reasonably to attempt to perform what he had promised. Deardorff-Jackson Co.
33 34
vs. National Producer Distributors Inc. and Chemtron vs. McLouth Steel .
6. Finally, it also appears that under the common law the seller's own conduct
must not have created the situation leading to the Impracticability of
35
performance, although this requirement is not specifically mentioned in UCC 2-615.
Other potentially interesting issues arise from UCC 2-615, especially
with regard to the allocation of available supplies among alternative buyers
should a discharge be allowed. These issues will not concern us here, but
rather let us return to our discussion of the functions of contract law and
discuss the current state of the impossibility doctrine in this context.
The doctrine of commercial impossibility and frustration of purpose
essentially deals with the allocation of risks associated with performance
of the contract between the promisor and the promisee. A doctrine of strict
- 12 -
performance or absolute liability essentially puts all of the risks not
otherwise provided for in the contract on the promisor, while a weaker rule
of discharge inherent in the impossibility doctrine shifts the burden of
some of these risks to the promisee. An economic evaluation of the current
status of the law must turn on the relative costs of the parties of insuring
against these risks and the associated effects on exchange and the
behavior of the economic agents involved.
A strict interpretation of the rule of discharge which puts too much
of the risk on the promisor would only lead to an incentive for him to
write a more detailed and complicated contract, entailing additional
negotiating costs, so as to shift some of the risks to the other party.
Similarly, a lenient interpretation of the rule of discharge, which for
example discharged obligations if costs rose by, say, 50 percent, would
either make such contracts unattractive to some parties negating an impor-
tant risk diversifying function of fixed price contracts and force the
promisee to provide for such contingencies in other more costly ways or
require that the promisee more completely specify all contingencies under
which he expects performance under the contract. In either case an
inappropriate rule of discharge can easily lead to increased transactions'
costs associated with the process of voluntary exchange. In addition, it
could limit further the set of available contingent claims opportunities
and lead to inefficiencies arising from an inability to fully diversify
risks.
Another unattractive consequence of a rule of discharge might occur
if the rule were extremely vague or randomly applied with differing require-
ments for discharge. This would not only increase the complexity and costs
- 13 -
of the contracting process but also lead to increased litigation resulting
both in additional court costs and delays in performance.
On the other hand, a well designed rule of discharge can aid and
reduce the costs of the process of exchange. It would be costly if not
impossible to lay out a complete contingent claims contract. There are a
number of possible contingencies, the occurrence of which can be contem-
plated by both parties and the effects of which one or both of the parties
would like to provide for. Wars, embargoes, government rules and regula-
tions, destruction of key supply facilities, hyperinflation, etc., can all
lead to effects on the supply and demand of the commodity in question which
would make performance by one or both parties unattractive. These contin-
gencies could all conceivably be listed in a contract along with the possible
occurrences of each and the nature of performance in each instance. It may
facilitate the contracting process, however, if it is understood or implied
in the contract that when events such as this occur and lead to dramatic in-
creases in the cost of performance or the impossibility of performance that
the contract will simply be discharged. If parties wanted to provide other-
wise, they could write it into the contract explicitly. The key to such a
rule of discharge working well is to provide an appropriate and well under-
stood list of occurrences and an appropriate and well-defined standard for
calculating what a dramatic increase in cost is.
Finally, a rule of discharge on grounds of impossibility should rule
out excuse in situations in which the impossibility results from the actions
of one of the parties to the contract or where the promisor could have rela-
tively easily taken actions to avoid the failure of the underlying condition.
To provide otherwise might lead to an increase in opportunistic behavior
- 14 -
or encourage inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of the promisor
,
which in the long run might result in contracting and exchange
responses by the promisee which would increase transaction's costs.
There are a number of questions, therefore, that must be answered
with regard to the current status of the doctrine of commercial impossibility.
To focus the discussion let's consider a particular simple example. Assume
that the supplier of some commodity signs a long-term contract to deliver
a specified amount of some commodity at a fixed price over a number of
years. After the contract is signed, the market price of
the commodity in question rises substantially and the supplier seeks to be
discharged from his obligation by appealing to UCC 2-615. Following the
previous discussion he would have to show the following:
1. A failure of an underlying condition of the contract must occur, the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption of the contract.
This requirement essentially sets the stage for a discharge. It indi-
cates that certain occurrences may in general appropriately be part of the
dickered terms of the contract and an associated insurance premium included
in the price with the risk being borne by the seller. In addition, it
indicates that certain occurrences may not be part of the dickered terms,
the risks not accounted for in the contract price and the associated risks
borne by the buyer. The definition of the appropriate occurrences to fall
under this requirement depends primarily on the associated requirements of
"foreseeability" and "assumption of risk" which help to define the appro-
priate boundary. As discussed below such a delineation appears to make
good sense.
- 15 -
It appears that the courts and the UCC have isolated an open set of
occurrences which are perceived to often fall outside the scope of the
dickered terms of the contract. These include fires, incapacity of key
personnel, changes in government rules and regulation, wars, embargoes,
and acts of God which also lead to large increases in the costs of per-
formance. The presumption is that these are uncertain events with low
probabilities and with consequences that are difficult to predict and
insure against and for which the risks would ordinarily be borne by the
seller in bilateral exchange transactions. But whether or not a parti-
cular underlying condition of the contract has failed and led to the in-
creased cost of performance rests on the simultaneous consideration of the
"foreseeability" test and the "assumption of risk" test. In laying out
this particular set of occurrences the UCC is alerting contracting parties
to the kinds of occurrences which will often satisfy the foreseeability
and assumption of risk test. If in a particular circumstance they wish to
provide otherwise, then the provision should be written into the contract
explicitly, otherwise they don't have to bother with it and it will
generally be assumed that the buyer bears the risk.
This type of provision makes good sense. It helps the contracting
process by laying out the kinds of situations in which the courts have
generally felt that the buyers have borne or should bear the risk. It
therefore helps to save on transactions costs for ordinary exchanges that
satisfy "normal" criteria. In extraordinary situations the parties are
alerted to the fact that they have to work a little harder in drawing up
the contract if they wish the risks to be divided differently.
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2. Foreseeability. As discussed above, UCC 2-615 states that the failure
of the underlying condition must have been unforeseen by the parties at the
time the contract was signed. The courts and commentators seem to have
taken a somewhat stronger interpretation, not only must the occurrence have
been unforeseen, but also unforeseeable by the parties.
The foreseeability doctrine appears to raise a number of difficulties.
To some extent every occurrence is foreseeable. There is always some
probability that a fire will destroy the anticipated source of supply,
that a key person will die, that various acts of God — like floods — will
occur, that there will be an embargo or war, etc. In an objective sense,
virtually nothing is truly unforeseeable to the extent that theoretically
every possible state of the world could be enumerated and some probability
assigned to its occurrence.
The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if we introduce the
concept of "bounded rationality". Following Simon and Williamson,
the concept of bounded rationality recognizes that human beings cannot
evaluate all possible states of the world or all available information
that might affect a particular situation. While conceptually all possible
states of the world could be enumerated with their associated probabilities
and "rational" decisions based on the full set of contingencies, in reality
the states of the world that can reasonably be considered in making decisions
are fairly limited. One way of thinking about the foreseeability doctrine
is as delineating the boundary between those contingencies that are reason-
ably part of the decisionmaking process and those that are not. This recog-
nizes that most contracts are not complete contingent claims contracts
including only some subset of all possible occurrences as a reasonable basis
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for decisionmaking and appropriately included either explicitly or implicitly
in the terms of the contract.
The foreseeability doctrine is therefore more of a "contemplation"
doctrine. What occurrences were or should have been included in the nego-
tiations underlying the contract and what contingencies were not? In recog-
nizing such cognitive realities, the courts effectively enforce the contract
only over that set of contingencies that was or should have been part of the
decisionmaking process. Such a requirement makes good sense because it
recognizes the realities of voluntary exchange. To require performance under
contingencies that could not efficiently be part of the decisionmaking process
would encourage the costly and difficult enumeration of a large
number of contingencies, raising the costs of private exchange.
Under a "contemplation" test we would ask: Did one of the parties
to the contract contemplate or should one of the parties to the contract
have contemplated a certain occurrence and make the probability of this
occurrence one of the bases on which the terms of the contract (including
the price) were negotiated? If the answer is no, then an additional
requirement for excuse has been satisfied, the occurrence not being covered
by the contract. If the answer is yes, then the reverse is the case, and
we would presume that the risk of the occurrence which has now occurred was
covered in the contract.
Under the circumstances it would appear that the "foreseen" interpreta-
tion of this requirement would be sufficient. We would ask the evidentiary
question of whether one of both parties contemplated the occurrence and
whether it formed the basis of their negotiating position. However, a "fore-
seeability" test appears in principle to have certain advantages. It allows
- 18 -
us to ask a normative question of whether one or more of the parties should
have contemplated such occurrences and made them a basis of the terms
of the contract. This stronger interpretation provides an incentive to both
parties, but especially the seller, to carefully evaluate available infor-
mation about uncertain occurrences involving supply and demand, of which the
seller will often have the best information, and make this part of the dickered
terms of the contract. The test then is not only did the parties contemplate
an occurrence and make it a basis of the contract, but stronger, should they
have done so? This stronger test should encourage more efficient use of
available information and help to insure that contingencies are properly
reflected in contract terms. This has the effect of not penalizing a shrewd
buyer (or, alternatively, rewarding an incompetent seller) who recognizes '
that the possibility of certain occurrences which should increase the pricfe
of the contract even if the seller fails to. In the long run this will serve
to eliminate those sellers from the market who do not utilize information
about alternative states of the world efficiently, as would occur in a
competitive market without transactions costs.
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the "unforeseeability" doctrine,
it must be admitted that it puts a terrible evidentiary burden on the courts.
They must evaluate evidence regarding whether the occurrences were contem-
plated or should have been contemplated. They must define the boundary on
bounded rationality. Especially after the fact it may appear that an occurrence
should have been contemplated to a greater extent than it might have appeared
before the fact. It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts have not
given substantial weight to the foreseeability test, rarely if ever granting
excuse based primarily on it.
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3. Assumption of risk. This requirement indicates that the assumption of
risk by one of the parties may be found not only in the contract itself,
but also in the events surrounding the process of exchange for the commodity
in question. In essence this is an extension of the foreseeability or
contemplation test and allows the courts to examine circumstances surrounding
the particular bargain in question. It allows the court to determine whether
or not the circumstances surrounding the contract imply the assumption of
risk of failure of an underlying condition by one of the parties or the other.
In particular, it encourages the court and the contracting parties to examine
what the "ordinary business risks" are that appear to be implicit in contracts
such as this in the marketplace. It bolsters the "contemplation" test by
assuming, unless specified differently, that the implied distribution of risks
in the particular contract is that which is normally understood in general
contractual relationships of this type and what appear to make sense given the
type of contract negotiated and the nature of the economic environment in which
it takes place. For example, since one of the primary reasons for a fixed
price commodity contract from the viewpoint of the seller is to insure against
fluctuations in price, it might be ordinarily assumed that the seller impli-
citly assumes all risks of price fluctuations unles otherwise specified and
that the contract will be honored except in the most extraordinary circum-
stances. For example, contracts for theaters might by custom (and reflecting
the relative costs of risk bearing) imply that the risks of fire are borne
by the renter rather than by the owner of the music hall in which case a fire
would lead to a discharge being allowed.
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4. Impracticability. Even if a seller is able to show that there was a
failure of an underlying condition of the contract, the contemplation of
which had not and should not have been part of the dickered terms of the
contract, and that he did not implicitly assume the risk by events or normal
procedures in the environment surrounding the contract, he still must prove
that the occurrence was "impracticable". While it is generally believed
that the notion of "impracticability" is somewhat weaker than the older doc-
trine of "impossibility", this wording of UCC 2-615 may also reflect the
fact that there is rarely an occurrence which makes performance objectively
impossible. No matter what the occurrence, an equivalent source of supply
can often be found, although at a price substantially higher than that in
the contract
»
In essence the impracticability doctrine says that contracts will be
enforced even if the above conditions are satisfied, unless it really hurts.
Other things being equal, the seller bears all of the risk unless performance
is extremely burdensome, in which case the buyer bears all of the risk. If
we had two similar occurrences, let's say an embargo, the seller would have
to perform if the price rise were small, but would not be required to perform
it the resulting cost increase were very large. Such asjoranetric treatment of
differing consequences from similar events only appears to make sense if we
expand our notion of possible contingencies to include elements identified by
both event and consequence, and assume that given a particular type of
occurrence the size of the consequence and the probability of the consequence
occurring are negatively correlated. That is to say, given the set of possible
embargoes, those with small consequences are much more probable that those
with large consequences. Then we could appeal to the notions of bounded
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rationality discussed above and argue that the low probability events are
outside of the boundary and not legally part of the contract . For the
impracticability test to make sense, it appears that this negative corre-
lation must hold. Alternatively, that the foreseeability test and the
impracticability test should be considered together. The impracticability
test extends the boundary between those events that are implicitly part of
the contract and those that are not. It is not so much that a fire has
destroyed the music hall, but that a fire has destroyed the music hall and
there is no readily available alternative; a more improbable occurrence.
It might be presumed that the occurrence of a fire and the fact that the
supplier would supply an alternative is ordinarily (or should be) part of
the terms of the contract and an insurence premium included in the price,
while real disasters are not part of the contract terms and insurance
generally provided by the buyer himself.
5. The seller must make all possible attempts to secure supplies required
for performance. When a buyer signs a contract with a seller, he himself is
not concerned with how the specified products will be obtained. He will
ordinarily simply presume that the seller will secure supplies in the way
that seems most efficient to him. The seller could, if he wanted to, specify
how he intended to secure supplies and gear the contract price to his success
in his endeavors. But this would be a very unusual contract. The buyer
wants the commodity and all he will ordinarily be concerned with is its price
and quality (broadly defined). Economic efficiency will be served so long as
the contract law does not give incentives to the seller to engage in ineffi-
cient procurement activities. This requirement essentially reflects the
buyer's understanding that the risks associated with procurement of the
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commodity contracted for are being borne by the seller and that presumably
a premium for bearing any risks associated with procurement, except those
discussed under other requirements, has been included in the contract price.
As a result the law should not excuse performance if it has become
"impracticable" because the seller has not made appropriate attempts to
secure supplies. This means, for example, that if a seller has contracted
to deliver potatoes three months from now, waits until the last day to
obtain supplies, and then finds that potatoes can only be found at a very
high price, he will not be excused from performance if he could have con-
tracted for the potatoes at lower costs during the course of the three
months or engaged in other activities to efficiently insure against any
losses. Any additional risks, which the seller incurs due to his own
procurement activities and beyond those implicit in the risk premium
built into the contract price, are his to bear and will not lead to a
discharge under UCC 2-615. This provision makes good sense. To allow
excuse when the speculative activities of suppliers have led to bad
outcomes would inefficiently encourage risk-taking behavior, raising
contracting cost both directly and indirectly through an increase in
transactions costs that would be associated with buyers trying to counter-
act the behavior of risk-taking sellers. Another way of thinking about this
provision is to say that it discourages certain kinds of "opportunistic"
behavior on the part of suppliers speculating on the hope that in the
event of a serious loss, the contract will not be enforced.
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6. A final consideration not included in UCC 2-615, but included in common
law interpretations and academic commentary and particularly appropriate to
the (Westinghouse) case at hand, is the requirement that that supplier does
not by his own actions cause the situation on which his claim of "imprac-
ticability" is based. This consideration is relevant in markets in which
the supplier in question is so large that his own activities have significant
effects on the price of the commodity in question.
Let's assume, for example, that a large wheat agent has contracted with
Russians to deliver a very large quantity of wheat equal to 25 percent of
U.S. production over a period beginning one year from now. The firm should
recognize two things. First, at current supply levels a 25 percent increase
in demand would result in a rather substantial increase in price. Second,
that supply is price sensitive for wheat required more than a year from
today. What the actual supply price will be next year depends critically
on the behavior of the agent. If for some reason he keeps this latent
demand secret until next year when he has the requirements, the supply sector
will not have time to properly react to actual demands and prices will very
likely be very high, although by chance there might be a very good crop and
prices could be much lower than this expected value. Alternatively, the agent could
enter the futures market now, gradually bidding up the price and encouraging
farmers to plant more wheat by effectively "revealing" this demand to the
market through his purchasing activities. A procedure something like this is
what we would probably expect from profit maximizing firms. But for reasons
of stupidity, risk loving, or in reaction to the possibility that the contract
might be voided if wheat prices get too high, the firm might be encouraged to
take the first strategy in the hope of making a killing if there is a very
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good wheat crop. This kind of behavior does not lead to efficient market
operation and should be discouraged by contract law. It is an addition to
requirement (5) which reinforces the notion that we will encourage all firms
to adopt an efficient procurement policy and will not encourage large firms
to use their positions to try to manipulate prices and distort the workings
of the market.
All things considered, UCC 2-615 as now interpreted does appear to pro-
mote voluntary exchange by reducing transactions costs and providing guidance
and encouragement for efficient use of information about alternative future
states of the world in contract negotiations and efficient procurement
policies by suppliers. , In general, it sets a fairly strict standard that
contracts will be performed unless certain low probability events occur.
It also insures that a rule of discharge will not reward suppliers who for
one reason or another do not behave efficiently. This section of the UCC
does, however, provide an opportunity to create severe market distortions if
the various requirements are interpreted too loosely or inconsistently. This
is of special concern if we continue to live in a world of rapid inflation,
increased uncertainty in commodity prices, protection of "key" corporations,
cartelization of the market for key commodities, etc. The Westinghouse case
discussed in the introduction may provide an important indication of where
this aspect of contract law is going. Before proceeding with an analysis of
this case, we must set the stage by discussing the evolution of the uranium
market in the United States.
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE URANIUM MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES: 1948-1975
It is normally assumed by economists that the prices observed in com-
petitive markets completely reflect all relevant information about demand
and supply. It is thought that various market institutions, such as con-
tracts and futures markets, will evolve so that buyers and sellers of a
particular commodity can rationally and quickly respond to information
reflected in changing supply and demand conditions. When such market in-
stitutions are working properly, they serve to efficiently link supply and
demand expectations in such a way that observed market prices efficiently
reflect these expectations. In such a world, a situation in which "expected
demand exceeds expected supply at prevailing prices" could persist for only
a very short period of time as rational economic agents engage in market
transactions which "rationalize" the situation leading to some combination
of price increases, demand reductions and increases in supply. When markets
operate in this way they have a number of desirable properties. In parti-
cular, markets will clear (there will be no shortages), commodities are
supplied in the most efficient (least cost) way given available information
and supply opportunities, and prices observed in the market will reflect the
expected long-run marginal cost of production (properly defined) . In addi-
tion, such efficient markets serve to economize on the information that any
particular economic agent must obtain to make rational decisions, since
prices alone reflect all relevant information.
Despite this conceptualization, it has been observed by a number of
economists that the nature of the price adjustment mechanisms implicit in it
39
remain quite obscure. Whether it is the Walrasian auctioneer, or some
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other hypothesized price adjustment mechanism, efficient price adjustments
somehow take place even though all competitive firms are price takers.
Efforts to try to understand this price adjustment mechanism, how it evolves,
40
and how it might differ from one market to the next have not been extensive.
Yet without such an efficient price adjustment mechanism, competitive markets
would not have the desirable properties mentioned above. In natural resource
markets like uranium the requirements of price adjustment mechanisms for
41
resource allocation are even more severe. Solow points out that efficient
market behavior requires a simultaneous flow equilibrium, and stock equilibrium
and gives an example of the kind of undesirable market performance that might
arise if the proper "feedback" mechanisms do not exist.
The uranium market itself is of interest for three reasons. First, uranium
consumption is projected to grow at a rate of fifteen percent per year over
the next twenty years and to become the major source of energy for generating
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electricity. Since no comprehensive studies about the uranium market exist,
this study appears worthwhile in light of uranium's growing importance and the large
number of public policies that affect it directly and indirectly. Second,
since the uranium market is a rather new market growing from virtual non-
existance at the end of World War II to maturity today, it provides a rare
opportunity to study the institutional development of a natural resource
market and especially the evolution of those "feedback" mechanisms that make
the market behave in particular ways. Finally, this study provides the basis
for examining the Westinghouse UCC 2-615 case as a specific example of the
use of the "impossibility" doctrine to obtain a discharge from contractual
obligations.
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The Demand for Uranium
The demand for uranium in the United States today is a function of
five factors:
1. The amount of installed nuclear capacity.
2. The amount that the nuclear generating capacity is utilized.
3. The tails assay at which the uranium enrichment facilities are run
(since the light water reactors in the U.S. require enriched uranium).
4. The possibility of reprocessing spent reactor fuel and recycling the
recovered uranium and plutonium.
5. Government requirements; primarily for weapons programs.
The amount of installed nuclear capacity is a function of the demand
for electricity and the relative economics of nuclear capacity compared to
alternative generating techniques such as coal and oil. The demand for
electricity is itself a function of the price of electricity, the price of
substitutes such as oil and natural gas and various demographic variables
and weather characteristics.
Since it has been argued by Westinghouse Csee Section IV below) that the
rise in oil prices subsequent to the Arab oil embargo was the cause of the
rise in uranium prices, it is convenient for the purposes of this discussion
to examine the economics of nuclear generation in the United States in the
context of rising oil prices.
Any effect that the Arab oil embargo would have had on the price of
uranium would have worked through its effects on demand expectations. One
could argue that the rapid rise in oil prices would lead to a shift away from
the use of oil as a generating fuel, increasing the demand for nuclear power
facilities directly plus a tendency to shift from the use of oil by final
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consumers toward the use of electricity (for heating, for example),
increasing the demand for electricity and the derived demand for nuclear
power facilities. In short, if one is to conclude that the change in
oil prices increased the demand for nuclear power facilities , one must
compare capacity expectations before the oil embargo with capacity expec-
tations after the embargo.
There are at least two reasons to believe a^ priori that the effect of
an increase in oil prices on nuclear capacity expectations would be both
small and take a long time to work its way through the system. First, it
takes nearly ten years to plan and complete construction of a nuclear
generating facility in the United States. The maximum number of nuclear
facilities that could have been in operation by 1984 was already determined
at the time of the Arab oil embargo. Capacity additions could be less than
this amount since construction can be delayed either deliberately or due to
technical and regulatory problems at almost any point within the planning-
construction cycle. Second, the increase in oil prices will not necessarily
lead to a net increase in electricity demand expectations if real electricity
prices rise along with real oil (and natural gas) prices. The effects of
increased oil prices on electricity demand depends upon the movement in the
price of electricity relative to its substitutes and the values of the own-
price and cross-price elasticities of demand.
In Table 1 projections of installed nuclear capacity for the United
States for 1985 and 1995 from various sources made in various years are pre-
sented. It is evident that not only have expectations for Installed nuclear
capacity for this period not increased, but they have decreased fairly
consistently since 1970. Factors such a reduced expectations for the demand
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for electricity, increased costs of nuclear generating facilities, con-
struction delays, financing difficulties, etc., have all led to reductions
in expected nuclear capacity, counterbalancing any effect that increased
oil prices might have had.
In addition, if we examine the expectations for installed nuclear
capacity in the rest of the non-communist world for 1980, 1985, and 1990, we
find that total government projections made since the Arab oil embargo are
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slightly lower than those made prior to it. More realistic estimates than
those made by official government sources reduces expected installed nuclear
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capacity for 1985 even further.
Other things held constant, the reduction in expected nuclear capacity
for the period at least over the next ten eyars should have also reduced
substantially expected uranium requirements. Although the reduced expecta-
tion tended to follow fairly quickly after the rise in oil prices, it would,
of course, be absurd (and counterintuitive) to say that the rise in oil prices
caused a reduction in nuclear capacity expectations. The reduced expectations
for installed nuclear capacity are, of course, due to other factors that are
largely associated with nuclear technology itself , have nothing in particular
to do with the oil situation, but happened to occur about the time oil prices began to rise.
Considering nuclear power capacity alone, we might think that expected
demand for uranium would have fallen along with the reduction in nuclear
generating capacity. However, we must also consider the other factors that
determine uranium requirements. Other things equal, an increase in the
enrichment tails assay from .20 percent to .30 percent increases uranium
requirements by about 20 percent. The economics of enrichment indicate that
the tails assay should vary directly with the cost of enrichment, primarily
the cost of electricity, and indirectly with the price of uranium.
30
Until 1973 the AEC ran its gaseous diffusion plants at .20 percent tails
assay. In December 1972 the AEC announced that it would begin to operate its
diffusion plants at an actual tails assay of 0.275 percent while maintaining
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a transactions tails assay of .20 percent until the end of 1974. Thereafter,
it would run the enrichment plants an 0.275 percent tails assay or above for
both operating and transactions purposes. The change in transactions tails
assay was delayed until July 1, 1976, early in 1975 with an increase in the
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operating tails assay to .30 percent beginning July 1, 1981.
This plan was revised again in mid-1975 providing for a reduction in the
operating tails assay to 0.25 percent and the maintenance of the transactions
tails assay at .20 percent until July 1, 1977, and then to rise gradually to
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.30 percent in 1981. Differences between the uranium requirements arising
from this "split-tails" policy are being made up by dipping into EEDA's
uranium stockpile. This behavior on the part of the AEC (now ERDA) reflects 1
anticipated enrichment capacity constraints in the early 1980 's rather than
an economic.- tradeoff between eiitflthffient costs a:nd the value of Titatiiilm. The
result is that uranium consumption per MWe will increase
by between 10 and 20 percent as a result in the increase in the operating
tails assay of the enrichment facilities.
Estimates of uranium requirements made prior to 1974 assumed that
limited recycling of uranium and plutonium derived from spent fuel reprocessing
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would begin by 1977. This date appears to be impossible to meet for several
reasons. Today there exists no commercial reprocessing capacity and even
under the most optimistic projections only limited reprocessing capacity will
49be available until the mid-1980' s. In addition, the costs of reprocessing
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have increased so much that there remain uncertainties about whether or not
it will even be economic to reprocess spent light water reactor fuel. Finally,
major environmental issues surrounding the reprocessing of plutonium have not
as yet been settled. The absence of reprocessing facilities and recycling
would in the long run increase uranium requirements by about ten percent.
Finally, while the government was the only demander of uranium through
the late 1960 's (see below), it has a sufficiently large stockpile that it
will not need to acquire additional uranium and in fact through its "split-
tails" policy will be an effective supplier of (free) uranium to the electric
utility industry over the next few years.
Taking all of these factors into account we can re-examine the demand
expectations for uranium itself. The reduction in nuclear generating
facilities should have acted to reduce uranium demand expectations. The
increase in the tails assay and the unavailability of recycling of uranium
and plutonium should have increased demand expectations. In Table 2 are
reported projections for uranium oxide requirements made prior to the Arab
oil embargo and subsequent to it. Comparing the two 1975 projections by
ERDA and the 1975 NAC projection presented in Table 2, we see that all
things considered projected uranium requirements through 1985 are well below
the ERDA (AEC) projections made prior to the oil embargo and rise in oil
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prices.
Filling Uranium Requirements
When building base load coal plants an electric utility will normally
attempt to secure a long-term supply commitment for coal either by signing
a long-term contract with a supplier or by developing its own coal reserves.
For uranium, the matching of long-term uranium requirements with long-term
- 32 -
uranium supply contracts has not occurred in general until very recently.
Tables 3 and 4 present the long-term supply commitments for uranium oxide
made by the electric utility industry as a whole and the reported unfilled
requirements as of January 1, 1974 and 1975. We can see that the industry
(at least, in the aggregate) maintained a substantial "short" position in
the uranium market to the extent that long-term uranium requirements deter-
mined when a plant entered the construction stage were not in general matched
by long-term supply contracts. Examining Table 4 we see two things. First,
uranium supply commitments are well below expected uranium requirements
beginning in the late 1970 's, and second, there was a substantial increase
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in supply commitments during 1974, met primarily from foreign sources..
The aggregate figures are somewhat misleading in that a number of utilities
thought that they were making at least medium-term supply contracts when
they ordered uranium from a reactor vendor acting as a uranium supply agent
(Westinghouse) , which itself maintained a very large "short" position (see
discussion below in Section IV) . The failure of demand requirements to be
matched even closely by long-term supply commitments has important impli-
cations for the behavior of this market, and this will be discussed further
below.
The Supply of Utranium Oxide - . . . .
Raw uranium ore is mined from open pit and underground mines. The
primary world suppliers are the United States, Canada, Australia, South
Africa, Gabon, and France. Mined ore normally has only a very small pro-
portion of uranium oxide Con the order of .2 percent by weight). Therefore,
near the mines a milling or processing plant is usually built which uses
chemical processes to separate the uranium oxide from the rest of the ore,
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leaving concentrated uranium oxide called yellowcake. It is the price of
yellowcake at the mill that is normally quoted. Since many mills are
vertically integrated backward into mining, we will not necessarily observe
a transactions price for ore of various uranium oxide contents, but rather
only a price for yellowcake.
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Mine-mill complex life has been estimated to average about ten years,
depending on the size of the ore body near which it is located. Current
milling capacity in the United States is 18-20,000 tons U„0o per year.
J o
Existing mills are expected to yield a peak capacity of 22,000 tons per year
in 1977, declining after this to reflect uranium ore depletion (see Table 5).
Development of new milling capacity is thought to take between three and
eight years, depending upon whether we begin with developed reserves, whether
open pit or underground mines are necessary, and whether new reserves must
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be fully developed.
The costs of building and operating a mine-mill complex are composed of
the following factors
:
1. The costs of exploration and development of uranium reserves. These
costs are a function of the U„0_ yield per foot drilled and the costs ofJO
drilling.
2. The construction costs of constructing a mine-mill complex and associated
interest charges. In 1975 the cost of a 1,000 ton/year mill was estimated at
$18 million.
3. The costs of operating and maintaining the mines.
4. The costs of milling the uranium ore. These costs are a function of the
materials costs of necessary materials and the U„0„ content of the ore milled.
J o
5. Taxes, costs of land and mineral rights, costs of access roads, trans-
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portation and other miscellaneous expenses.
Over the past twenty years there has been a secular reduction in the
U„0o content of ore delivered to mills, falling from a high of .32 percent
J o
U„0 in 1952 to a low of .17 percent ore content in 1975 (see Table 6).
3 o
In addition the average depth of exploratory holes has increased from 148
feet in 1958 to 482 feet in 1975 (see Table 7), with an associated deline
in discovered reserves per foot drilled. In addition, drilling costs
increased from $1.49 per foot in 1973 to $2.09 per foot in 1974, and
another 40 percent in 1975.
Based on depletion alone, other things held constant, the costs of mining
and milling uranium would have increased by nearly 80 percent in real terms
since the early 1950's. In addition, wages for miners have increased con-
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siderably more rapidly than the average rate of inflation. While detailed
assessments of the current long-run incremental costs of constructing and
operating mine and mill facilities are not readily available, it appears from
an examination of the ore quality statistics that discovery rates and costs of key com
ponents of the overall cost of uranium oxide have increased substantially in real tenq
since the 1950 's. As I shall discuss below, current ore contents of U„Oq probab;
reflect more intensive exploration of old reserves rather than the content
that would be realized for the industry if it were in long-run equilibrium.
As with any exhaustible resource, the expected uranium price trajectory
depends critically on the reserves of the resource that are expected to be
available at various costs of production. Uranium reserve data are reported
and referred to in the United States and abroad in a way unlike any other
fuel resource. Instead of merely publishing figures for the locations,
depth, concentrations, and nature of the host rock as is common for coal.
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oil and natural gas, the AEC began very early on to report reserves based
on a "forward cost" concept. Uranium reserves are reported in terms of
tons of uranium oxide that could be mined at less than forward costs of
$8, $15, $30, etc. Forward costs include essentially the variable costs of
mining, hauling and milling uranium. Property acquisition costs, finding
costs, costs of money, capital costs, ore replacement costs, profits and
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taxes are not included in the cost estimates. This forward cost concept,
therefore, only includes some of the costs that would make up the true long-
run marginal opportunity costs of uranium that would determine the floor
60
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on uranium prices for a competitive market in long-run equilibrium. (The
other component of price other than long-run marginal production costs would
be "user cost" associated with a non-replenishable resource.) As a result,
the "forward cost" of a particular reserve deposit being mined reflects pri-
marily the short-run variable costs of producing from a developed facility.
We would only expect prices to equal forward costs in a situation in which
a competitive Industry were in a position of excess capacity where demand
requirements were not pushing against the constraints of existing capacity.
Nevertheless, it is apparent from reading the literature on uranium
prices and uranium reserves that many people in the industry thought of
forward costs of reserves being mined as good approximations to market
prices. The AEC and international organizations such as the OECD and IAEA
discuss the costs of uranium for power reactors in terms of the forward
costs concept and tend to equate expected prices with forward costs.
The fact that actual transactions prices were for several years approximately
equal to the reported forward cost figures for the low cost reserves that
formed the major basis for discussion of future reserves reinforced such
tendencies to confuse forward costs with long-run market prices.
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Although recent AEC publications contain footnotes Indicating that
forward costs would not necessarily represent market prices, the distinction
was never emphasized until prices began to rise far above the forward cost
of $8 to $10 were normally thought of as the reserves that would be exploited
in the medium term. In December 1975, the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences recommended that the forward cost system of
reporting reserves be abandoned. The report says that the forward cost
concept is inherently misleading and confusing and that forward costs are
misinterpreted since forward costs do not represent the prices at which
uranium will be marketed.
This discussion should not be interpreted to mean that everyone in
the nuclear industry was fooled into thinking that the forward cost figures
associated with low cost reserves were representative of the long-run price
of uranium oxide in an expanding market. On the contrary, many of those
familiar with the economics of the supply sector perceived an inconsistency
between expected supply and expected demand at the prices being quoted by
government agencies, reactor vendors and utilities. We will discuss this
further in the section below on uranium prices.
The Structure of the Uranium Industry
It is difficult to get good information on the structure of the uranium
mining sector. The Census of Manufacturers does not report separate concen-
tration ratio information for uranium mining. We do have information on
uranium milling and since about 90 percent of all uranium reserves are owned
or controlled by the millers, concentration ratios for the milling portion of
the product stream should give us a fairly good upper bound estimate for the
concentration ratios of the mining and milling sector as a whole. In Table 8
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are reported four, eight and sixteen firm concentration ratios for the
uranium milling capacity. Four and eight firm concentration ratios are on
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the moderate to high side relative to other primary energy industries.
It should be remembered, however, that since transportation costs for
uranium concentrate are small relative to the value of the product trans-
ported, the relevant geographical market is a national market, whereas the
relevant geographical market for uranium's chief substitute, coal, is
probably a set of regional markets. An examination of the concentration
ratios alone would seem to put this industry in a gray area with regard
to the potentials for competition. The industry has concentration ratios
higher than those in industries that would be generally conceded to be
vigorously competitive, but lower than in those industries that have been
often cited for potential or actual antitrust abuse. The structure of
the industry, as measured by these concentration ratios, does not give us
enough information by themselves to draw conclusions regarding the real or
potential existence of oligopolistic pricing behavior. At least during the
period 1969-1975 uranium mining and milling appears to have been quite
unprofitable with many major firms achieving accounting losses. At least
during this period of excess capacity (see below) there does not appear to
have been sufficient market power to lead to price levels consistent
with even positive profits. The ability to coordinate supply behavior so
as to raise prices above competitive levels may be even more difficult
today as import restrictions are lifted and firms in many other countries
become eligible to sell uranium in the U.S.
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The Uranium Market in the United States: 1948-1975
The uranium "market" can only be understood by viewing it in an
historical context composed of several distinct historical periods.
1. 1948-1957: Vigorous expansion of the uranium industry in response
to attractive payments offered by the AEC (the First Expansionary
Period)
.
2. 1957-1962: Expansion ceases as the AEC receives deliveries on existing
contracts but will no longer encourage expansion of the industry. Uranium
deliveries peak, but exploratory and other expansionary activity comes to
a virtual halt.
3. 1962-1969: A period of industry decline as the AEC purchases a
reduced amount of uranium from reserves discovered prior to November 1958
at prices at or below $8 per pound in order to keep some private uranium
firms in business until commercial demand develops.
4. 1969-1973: A commercial market begins to develop but with serious
inconsistencies between demand and supply expectations at prevailing prices.
The market develops slowly and is characterized by continuing excess capacity
and a failure of the uranium consuming sector to match long-term requirements
with long-term supply contracts.
5. 1973-1975: The commercial market reaches maturity (the Second Expansionary
Period). The demand side and the supply side of the market begin to come into
balance as utilities go to the market to try to cover medium- and long-term
requirements. Uranium prices rise dramatically.
Let us examine each period in detail.
;
1. 1948-1957: Period of Vigorous Expansion. The Atomic Energy Commission
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was the only buyer of uranium during this period of time in the United
States. Purchases were primarily for weapons acquisition and to provide
material for government-owned plutonium producing and experimental reactors.
At the beginning of this period there was essentially no domestic uranium
industry. AEC requirements came from foreign sources, primarily Canada
and the Belgian Congo. Beginning in 1948 the AEC set as one of its primary
goals the rapid expansion and development of a domestic uranium mining and
milling industry composed of privately held firms. To accomplish this
goal, the AEC embarked on a program to purchase ore and contract for milling
services at prices which would encourage private firms to enter the Industry.
The AEC established a fixed minimum price schedule for the purchase of
uranium ore of various qualities and provided firms with additional bonus
payments for initial production of uranium, for development expenditures,
and for the production of ore with U„0„ contents of greater than .20 percent.
The AEC also let participation contracts to encourage uranium exploration
and paid for access roads to mining areas. The AEC ran the milling part of
the supply stream something like a regulated utility. A prospective mill
owner would have to apply to the AEC for a certificate of need. If granted,
the AEC would sign a long-term (five to seven year) cost plus profit contract
for the delivery of a specified quantity of U^Oj, over the contract period.
The pricing procedure was favorable in a number of respects; in particular,
rapid depreciation of mill plant and equipment was allowed.
The result of the AEC policy was the rapid expansion of the mining and
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milling industry. By 1957 mills had either been built or were under con-
struetulon with a capacity of over 21,000 tons of ore per day Cabout 18,000
68
tons of U per year) .
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2. 1957-1962: The Uranium Industry Reaches Its Peak In Terms of Production
But Expansion is Halted by the AEC. In 1957 and 1958 the AEC began to change
its policy regarding the expansion of the mining and milling industry. It
was decided that it was no longer in the government's interest to encourage
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additional expansion of the industry. Existing contractual arrangements
running until March 1962 would be honored and ore purchased at the stipulated
contract prices. No new contracts were to be signed for the period up to
1962 except under special circumstances. Beginning April 1, 1962, through
December 31, 1966, the AEC would purchase not more than 500 tons UoO^ per
property at a fixed price of $8.00 per pound. Reserves developed prior to
November 1958 were the only ones eligible. Quantities beyond 500 tons might
be purchased after negotiation but at prices below $8 per pound. When the
policy was announced in 1957, no purchases from new reserves were anticipated.
During this period the uranium industry reached its peak in terms of
production and capacity (see Table 9) . More uranium oxide was produced by
the industry during 1961 and 1962 than has ever been produced subsequently
(see Table 9). However, exploration activity peaked in 1957 and then began
to decline in response to AEC policy (see Figure 1)
.
3. 1962-1968: The Uranium Industry Contracts. This period was a critical
hiatus for the industry. No major new AEC contracts were let and deliveries
to the AEC declined as old contracts had expired and the new "maintenance"
contracts at low prices were signed. The AEC procurement policy was apparently
designed to maintain some uranium mining and milling capacity in operation so
that a base load industry would exist and be available for the commerical
uranium requirements that were expected to begin to materialize at the end
of the decade. The $8 price was deemed sufficient to allow at least some of
1
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the existing firms to continue operating rather than to encourage entry.
As a result, the prices were set sufficiently high to cover at least the
variable operating costs of at least some of the larger and more efficient
mines and mills in the industry.
Many mines and mills closed during the period (see Table 5) as U_0„ require-
ments declined and since the $8 price combined with restricted orders led to
losses for many of the smaller operations. There was also substantial
merger activity with the takeover of mining properties by the larger mills
and the merging of companies engaged primarily in uranium mining and milling
by larger companies engaged in the large minerals and fuels industries. The
AEC also stretched out some of its 1962-1966 contractual arrangements until
1970 and agreed to purchase additional quantities of uranium at prices below
$8 to help keep some of the mills in business until a substantial commercial
market developed. The first deliveries to commercial buyers began in 1967,
but commercial purchases did not surpass even the meager AEC purchases until
1970 (see Table 10).
The uranium industry during this period of time had many of the
characteristics of a declining industry. There were many exits of mines and
mills, and exploratory activity declined dramatically (see Table 5 and Figure 1)
.
Supply was provided by more intensive utilization of existing reserves rather
than new reserves and the production from reserves with the lowest short-run
costs of production. This behavior is reflected in the declining grade of
ore mined beginning in 1963 (see Table 6) and the gradual shift away from
high cost underground mines to low cost open pits mines (see Table 11) . This
latter movement occurred despite the fact that the majority of low cost
uranium reserves C58 percent) were estimated to be located in deposits
. . ^ , . . 71requiring underground mining.
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Drilling activity is very low through 1966 (see Figure 1) reflecting
the declining nature of the industry. Beginning in 1967 there is a rapid
upturn in exploratory drilling, and new commitments for milling capacity
to come on line in the early 1970 's. Given the supply lead times indicated
previously, such activity was probably in anticipation of a large commercial
market developing by 1973. This is consistent with AEC projections made in
the late 1960 's that there would be 48,000 MWe of nuclear capacity on line
72in 1973 and uranium requirements of 14-15,000 tons of U„Oq by 1973.
J o
4. 1969-1973: A Commercial Uranium Market Develops. The first two years
of the period witnessed vigorous exploratory activity and a large increment
in milling capacity put into the construction stage. However, by 1970 a
number of things became evident. First, the growth in nuclear power was
not nearly as rapid as optimistic projections made three years earlier had
indicated. Construction delays, technical problems, regulatory delays, etc.,
all slowed the nuclear program. Actual nuclear capacity in 1972 and 1973 was t
be only half of what had been predicted . In response to reduced demand expectations
drilling activity pea:ked in 1969 and did not reach an equivalent level until 1975
.
Perhaps more importantly, by 1971 the uranium mining and milling industry
began to argue that uranium prices were simply not high enough to attract new
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exploration, development, mine and mill investment. The mine and mill
operators were reluctant to sign long-term fixed price contracts because much
of the requirements would have to come from reserves which have not been
either developed or even discovered, and the cost of developing, building and
74
operating- these new facilities were highly uncertain. But consimiers of
uranium were also reluctant to sign long-term contracts at open ended prices
for at least two reasons. There remained great uncertainty as to the timing
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of nuclear facility operating dates. There also appeared to be plenty of
uranium around in the spot market for a price no higher than $8 both because
one large seller (Westinghouse) was willing to sell at such low prices and
because until July 1973 the AEC was willing to sell from its stockpile at
$8 per pound. As a result many of the consumers did not attempt to secure firm
long-term supply commitments. Actual delivery commitments fell well short of
expected requirements for a period more than four or five years out. By 1972
the industry found itself in the peculiar position of facing expected demand
growth for uranium of prodigious magnitudes while the supply side of the market
was expanding very slowly. A number of commentators noted the growing gap
between supply realities and demand expectations. At least through 1972
this basic and obvious contradlciton between supply and demand expectations
remained largely ignored by the utility industry and the reactor vendors in
terms of their willingness to cover their long-term requirements with long-
term purchase contracts including "front end" money to help develop new supply
7fi
facilities. In response to this situation, exploratory drilling activity
fell of dramatically in 1971 and 1972, and milling capacity peaks out in 1972
(see Figure 1 and Table 5) . Many remaining small mines went bankrupt or
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merged with only the large integrated firms remaining in the market.
Uranium prices in the market remain below even the $8 that the AEC paid in
the middle and late I960' s through 1973 despite the fact that a "market view"
indicated a serious inconsistency between demand and supply expectations at
prevailing prices.
5. 1973-1975: Demand and Supply Expectations Are Rationalized. This period
begins with a profound inconsistency between demand expectations and supply
expectations at prevailing prices for uranium. An agent evaluating the market
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as a whole in 1972 should have seen clearly that one of three things was
going to happen sometime soon. Demand expectations would be revised down-
ward sufficiently to make additional supply expansion unnecessary (unlikely)
.
The uranium supply industry was bluffing, and capacity expansion would begin
quickly at prevailing market prices, and prevailing contractual arrangements,
or the AEC would extend the termination date of sales from its stockpile at
$8 per pound beyond July 1, 1973 (also unlikely). The price of uranium would
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rise sufficiently to clear the market (very likely) . Before proceeding we
therefore want to examine carefully the market behavior which allowed an
inconsistency between demand and supply expectations to develop and persist
through 1973.
The first thing to recognize about the uranium market of the early 1970 's
is that it was a very new market. Commercial sales of any appreciable amount
did not develop until 1970. Since uranium had never been used as a fuel
before, purchasers had virtually no experience with uranium, uranium prices
or uranium contracts. While expected demands for uranium for the late 1970 's
were quite high, actual private consumption was very low in the period 1970 to
1972, Since the industry was in an excess supply situation, there was plenty
of uranium around in the spot market at very low prices. Some uranium con-
sumers seem to have expected uranium prices in the $8 to $10 range throughout
the life cycle of the reactors under consideration. These expectations were
based on a number of circumstances. Uranium prices had in fact been below
$8 per pound in nominal terms for nearly ten years. The AEC, on which the
industry depended heavily during these early years, reported reserves and
associated statistics for so-called $8 and $10 uranium which was generally
interpreted as reflecting the price of uranium (see discussion above)
.
Finally, Westinghouse, acting as a major buying agent, was signing fixed
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price contracts for uranium at $8 to $10 per pound, reinforcing the expec-
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tations that the less knowledgeable agents in the market had. Those
buyers who in fact perceived the inconsistency between demand and supply
expectations could simply sign a contract with Westinghouse to cover their
medium-term uranium requirements. As a result, at least until late 1973,
low price expectation were reinforced by a variety of factors, and demanders
had little incentive to negotiate long-term open ended price contracts that
a number of the suppliers were demanding.
On the supply side, the reluctance of suppliers who perceived the
evolving inconsistency without firm delivery contracts with substantial
escalation provisions is also understandable. The uranium industry had been
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extremely unprofitable throughout the late 1960's and early 1970's. A
number of firms which had engaged in vigorous exploratory activity and built
additional mining and milling facilities in the late 1960 's were badly
"burned" as the expected uranium demands did not materialize. Existing
firms were understandably cautious about bearing all of the risks of expan-
ding supply given their recent experience, desiring instead to share the
8?
risks in some way with their utility customers.
Uncertainties about demand were not the only factors causing reluctance
on the part of potential suppliers to bear all of the risks of supply invest-
ments. The Atomic Energy Commission owned 50,000 tons of uranium, which if
released to the market for sale at the then prevailing AEC price of $8 would
provide sufficient additional supply capacity to meet demand until the late
1970's and put an effective $8 lid on prices until then. But by mid-1971
the AEC announced its "split-tails" policy as a method of disposing of its
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uranium stockpile without putting it directly on the market eliminating this
uncertainty. Another uncertainty on the supply side leading to reluctance to
sign long-term contracts on the part of utilities was imports. Throughout
this period imports of uranium by commercial buyers was prohibited. It was not
until late 1973 that the AEC announced its proposed import policy which would
allow limited imports beginning in 1977 and would remove all restrictions by
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1984. Finally, one large supply intermediary, Westinghouse, itself was an
important factor. Westinghouse had contracted to deliver for a very large
proportion of the expected domestic uranium requirements (see Section IV below
As far as anyone knew, these requirements would be met by a combination of
Westinghouse supply contracts and production from its own uranium reserves.
Since Westinghouse did not reveal its short position until July 1975, both |
potential suppliers and potential demanders could have legitimately viewed I
this proportion of the market as "covered".
Under the circumstances it is understandable that supply agents would
be reluctant to make investments in new capacity without some kind of con-
tractual arrangements which at least share the risks with potential customers
Both because of weak incentives and general unfamiliarity with the overall
market situation, utility customers did not show interest in either long-
term contracts nor risk sharing arrangements. As a result the inconsistency
between demand and supply expectations was created and persisted.
A number of things occurred from mid-1973 to 1975 that helped to close
j
the gap between demand expectations and supply realities . These events com-
bined to encourage many utilities to go to the market to try to cover their
expected uranium requirements with long-term contracts. As firms began to
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sign contracts for forward delivery of uranium, it soon became evident that
existing capacity of the uranium mining and milling industry was insufficient
to cover the industry's uranium needs for the period beginning in about
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1980. This situation was gradually revealed as existing capacity became
fully committed, as many utilities could not obtain bids for uranium under
fixed price contracting arrangements, and as it became evident that
Westinghouse had substantial unfilled uranium commitments. The result was
a rapid rise in uranium prices. The events which led to the rationalization
of the inconsistencies between demand and supply expectations appear to be
the following:
a. Change in AEC Enrichment Contract Criteria. In January 1973 the AEC
announced a change in its enrichment contracting procedures. The AEC proposed
that purchasers of its enrichment services would have to sign long-term (ten
year) fixed commitments contracts for enrichment services. These contracts
would have to be signed eight years in advance of initial enrichment service
and included penalty clauses for changes in schedules. Although the AEC
announced its proposed contracts at the beginning of the year, the new policy
could not be final until Congressional hearings were held by the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee (JAEC) . Since AEC proposals had frequently been changed in
the past as a result of opposition by segments of the industry during JAEC
hearings, there remained great uncertainty about the nature of the AEC*s
contracting requirements and their timing until after approval was granted
by the JAEC and contracts became available. While there had been sugges-
tions for changes in AEC enrichment contracts even prior to 1973 and while
the discussion during 1973 indicated that some movement to long-term con-
tracts would be forthcoming in the future, the contracts themselves were
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not available in final form until September 1973 and none were signed until
December 1973.
There is substantial evidence to indicate that the primary motivation
of the AEC in changing its enrichment criteria was to create an environment
which would encourage private industry to enter the enrichment market. The
long-term contract was required because of the difficulties private firms
would have in obtaining financing without substantial long-term commitments
from utilities, which as in the uranium market itself, utilities had been
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reluctant to sign. By requiring long-term contracts the AEC could make
it clear that its own enrichment capacity was fully committed and provide a
standard contracting format which would force utilities to reveal in the
market their own long-term requirements and thus encourage private investment
to meet it. In some sense the enrichment portion of the fuel cycle was in a
situation similar to the mining and milling sector. It was evident that
substantial additional capacity would be needed in the 1980 's to meet demands,
but private industry was not able or willing to make the substantial invest-
ments required without firm commitments from utilities. By changing to a
long-term contract framework the AEC hoped that it was creating contracting
institutions that would make it economically desirable for firms to begin to
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build private enrichment facilities.
The effect of the long-term contracting requirements for enrichment ser-
vices appears to have been to accelerate utility attempts to tie down uranium
requirements that would go along with the enrichment contracts. The industry
literature is filled with discussions beginning in late 1973, but especially
during 1974, as fixed commitment enrichment contracts are signed, that the
vigorous activity on the buying side is a result of utilities' attempts to
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fill the uranium requirements associated with their long-term enrichment
contracts rather than a response to increased demand for uranium or the oil
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embargo. In short, the result of the change in enrichment contract
criteria appears to have been a rapid movement to match up long-term enrich-
ment contracts with long-term uranium supply contracts.
b. AEC Uranium Stockpile. By early 1972 the uncertainties regarding
the disposition of the government's huge U„On stockpile discussed above were
eliminated. As a result the AEC would no longer act as an "overhang" on the
market discouraging utilities from making long-term contracts in the hopes
of getting cheap U^Oq from the AEC. This factor should have given some en-
couragement to utilities to go into the private market to obtain uranium
commitments and also relieved some of the uncertainty faced by the mining
and milling sector.
c. The medium- and long-term supply problem appears to have been
gradually revealed during 1973, 1974, and early 1975. While utilities were
able to make fairly substantial foreign purchases for future delivery in
1974, the supply situation remained very tight. The industry literature of
1973 and 1974 is filled with discussions of rising prices and short capacity
90
and increasing activity by uranium consumers to cover their requirements.
d. Rumors of Westinghouse's short position apparently began circulating
91in the industry by early 1974, but it was not until July 1975 that Westing-
house confirmed that it was indeed short and the large magnitude of that short
position. On July 14, 1975, Westinghouse announced that it was short between
40 and 60 million pounds of uranium for the period 1978-1995. Outside esti-
mates have put that short position at close to 70 million pounds of uranium
concentrate. This amounted to somewhere between 25 percent and 100 percent
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of total industry uncommitted uranium requirements (see Section IV below
for alternative calculations) for the period around 1980 and made absolutely
clear the extent to which firm long-term contracts fell below Industry
requirements. By this time the inconsistency between uranium requirements
and supply capabilities at current prices had been revealed in the market
and had led to substantial price increases Csee discussion of prices below).
Westinghouse's confirmation of its short position, especially its size,
raised the possibility that there might be an absolute shortage of uranium
for the period around 1980 due to lead time constraints on new mining and
milling ventures.
e. The Arab Oil Embargo (October 1973). To the extent that the Arab
oil embargo had an effect on the price of uranium, it must have been an
indirect "marketing" effect rather than a direct effect increasing the
expected demand for uranium oxide. The effect of the oil embargo and the
rise in prices was probably psychological, making electricity producers more
aware of the need to have an insured supply of fuels. Since many consumers
were at the beginning of 1974 maintaining large short positions "in uranium,
the effect of their increased awareness of availability problems was to en-
courage them to go to the market to contract for future requirements. In
other words, the Arab oil embargo's effect was to encourage uranium consumers
to firm up their demand requirements by going to the market and trying to
sign contracts for future delivery rather than to increase demand expectations.
To summarize, there appear to be four historical phases in the history
of the uranium market in the United States;
1. 1948-1957: Vigorous expansion of the uranium industry in response to
attractive payments schedule offered by the AEC (the First Expansionary
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Period of the Industry)
.
2. 1957-1962: Expansion ceases as the AEC receives deliveries on existing
contracts but will no longer encourage expansion of the industry. Uranium
deliveries peak, but exploratory and other expansionary activity comes to
a virtual halt.
3. 1962-1969: A period of industry decline as the AEC purchases a reduced
amount of uranium from reserves discovered prior to November 1958 at prices
at or below $8 per pound in order to keep some private uranium firms in
business until commercial demand develops.
4. 1969-1973: A commercial market begins to develop but with serious incon-
sistencies between demand and supply expectations at prevailing prices. The
market develops slowly and is characterized by continuing excess capacity
and a failure of the uranium consuming sector to match long-term requirements
with long-term supply contracts.
5. 1973-1975: The commercial market reaches maturity (the Second Expansionary
Period of the industry) . The demand side and the supply side of the market
begin to come into balance as utilities go to the market to try to cover
medium- and long-term requirements and purchasing mechanisms develop to match
demand and supply better. Uranium prices rise dramatically.
The Behavior of Uranium Prices
The behavior of uranium prices is conveniently analyzed in terms of the
historical periods that characterize the uranium industry Csee Table 12)
.
Since there was no private market for uranium prior to 1968, we can examine
the prices paid for uranium concentrate by the AEC during the period 1950 to
1967. The years prior to 1958 show the highest AEC payments reflecting the
prices that the AEC had to pay to attract private industry into uranium mining
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and milling. Since there was in fact substantial entry into the industry,
these prices must have been a^ least as high as those which would have to
prevail in a competitive market in long-run equilibrium for similar long-term
(seven years) contracts. The lower uranium prices in the late 1950 's appear
to reflect the latter year prices under old contracts combined with the $8
price for new contracts signed after 1958.
Beginning in December 1968 we can get spot price quotations for uranium
purchased in the private market. Through 1973 these prices remain well
below those paid by the AEC previously and the price at which the AEC was
willing to sell uranium until July 1973. These low prices, I believe,
reflect the declining industry — excess capacity nature of the uranium
mining and milling industry at this time — and therefore represent the
short-run variable costs of producing uranium concentrate from existing
facilities. They represent the short-run flow equilibrium of a natural
resource market with excess short-run capacity in the absence of the required
feedback mechanisms which would yield the appropriate long-run stock and flow
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equilibrium. These prices are in line with the "low cost" reserves reported
by the AEC forward cost reserve criterion which were what the AEC concen-
trated on for policy purposes. Given the excess capacity in the industry
and substantial evidence that sufficient new capacity was not being added
to meet expected demands in the late 1970 's and early 1980 's at prevailing
prices, the then prevailing prices probably give a good feeling for the
variable costs of uranium production but not the total long-run marginal
costs or long-run prices reflecting both long-run production costs and
"user" costs.
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Uranium prices begin to rise in 1973. They increase about twenty per-
cent during 1973 reflecting increased forward purchasing activity by
utilities as well as rising labor and operating costs. But it is in 1974
that prices really begin to increase dramatically as the inconsistencies
between supply and demand expectations are revealed in the market. Prices
rise fifty percent during the first six months and another fifty percent
during the second half of the year. 1 believe that this price rise reflects
the events discussed above. First, the long-term contracts for enrichment
that utilities begin to sign in December 1973 engendered increased buyer
interest in the forward uranium market. Second, domestic suppliers appear
to have largely withdrawn fromthe market in 1974 reflecting their response
to prices rising faster than the rate of interest and the fact that proven
reserves had been largely committed. Mining and milling companies appear
to have been reluctant to sign what were then typical fixed price plus
escalation contracts for reserves and milling capacity that had not as yet
been developed. The tight domestic supply situation is evidenced by both
the rapidly rising price for uranium and the fact that the vast majority
of contracts signed by utilities during that period were with foreign
T 94suppliers.
Prices continued their rapid rise in 1975. In March, Westinghouse
acknowledged for the first time that it was short uranium, although it
95
minimized the extent of its exposure. By June 1975, just prior to
Westinghouse 's announcemnt of its huge short position, the price had risen
to $22 per pound, about double what it was a year earlier. In September,
Westinghouse announced that it would not honor its contracts for uranium
delivery beyond the uranium that it had itself already contracted for, and
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by the end of December the spot price had risen to $35 per pound. Between
February 1975, just before Westinghouse first acknowledged its short position,
and December 1975, the price of uranium doubled.
The price run-up in 1974 and 1975 appears to reflect the rationalization
between demand expectations and supply expectations caused by a variety of
factors encouraging firms to reveal and fill their long-term requirements
by actually contracting with suppliers. If consumers of uranium had made
timely medium- and long-term commitments with suppliers for uranium, prices
would have begun to rise earlier and would have risen more gradually. It is
also possible that prices would not have risen so far because timely addi-
tions of supply would have eliminated any possibility of a bottleneck around
1980.
Before proceeding with a more detailed duscussion of Westinghouse 's
behavior in the market and the claim for a discharge under UCC 2-615, it is
worth examining the uranium prices reported a bit more closely. A careful
examination of the price series in Table 12 gives us some useful information.
We know that the prices that the AEC paid during the first expansionary period
(1950-1958) were at least high enough to encourage entry for the simple reason
that there was substantial entry. Therefore, the first question to ask is
how do the prices which we observed in the 1973-1975 period Cwhich I have
called the second expansionary period) compare with the prices the AEC paid
during the first expansionary period? In column 2 of Table 12 I present
deflated price data using the "structures" price index component of the GNP
deflator. We can see that at least until the summer of 1975, when Westing-
house revealed its short position, real prices remained well within the range
of prices paid by the AEC during the first expansionary period of the uranium
industry. Even the post July 1975 prices are close to the range of prices
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paid by the AEC.
But merely deflating for inflation is not enough. The average grade
of ore mined has declined fairly substantially since the mid-1950 's, im-
plying an associated increase in the real cost per pound of yellowcake.
The ore content in 1974 was only about 60 percent of the ore content during
the early 1950 's and only about 70 percent of the ore content in 1961. Part
of this deterioration reflects the Intensive mining of old reserves rather
than long-run depletion of the uranium reserve stock. Nevertheless we expect
some depletion to occur over time even if the industry is in long-run equi-
librium. In columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 12 I have, therefore, calculated
equivalent price for 1973-1975 assuming 10, 20, and 30 percent depletion
since the first expansionary period. Even for an assumption of ten percent
depletion the equivalent real prices of uranium prior to July 1975 are well
within the range of prices paid by the AEC during the first expansionary
period. There are other adjustments in real costs that we could make, such
as tightened radiation standards, increased mine safety standards, etc. But
this is unnecessary to make the point that the real prices of uranium cer-
tainly in July 1975 and probably even in December were no higher and perhaps
even somewhat lower than the prices the AEC paid to encourage entry into the
industry.
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IV. WESTINGHOUSE AND UCC 2-615
Westinghouse's Behavior in the Market
-During the late 1960 's and early 1970 's Westinghouse
offered to supply fuel for light water reactors in the U.S. and
abroad. In general, Westinghouse offered a complete
nuclear fuel system, including the reactor and steam generating system,
initial fuel core and a variable number of reloads. Westinghouse also
agreed to supply fuel reloads to several reactors supplied by other ven-
dors. Westinghouse generally offered uranium fuel at a fixed base price
plus some escalation. The escalation factor apparently reflected changes
only in certain labor and materials cost indexes, however, and was not
directly geared to the market price of uranium oxide. The prices at which
uranium was sold were in the range of $8 to $10 per pound. As of January 1,
1975, Westinghouse signed uranium contracts with 23 U.S. utilities and three
foreign utilities involving 49 reactors , of which 11 were reactors supplied
97by other vendors. As of January 1, 1975, it is estimated that Westinghouse
had uranium oxide commitments of approximately 60,000 tons for the period
1975-1988 and contracts to purchase only 14,000 tons during that period plus
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an inventory of 6,000 to 7,000 tons. This leaves a "short" position of
about 40,000 tons (see Table 13), of which about 5,000 tons are associated
with contracts which have full cost pass through provisions. In summary,
as of January 1, 1975, Westinghouse had commitments to supply 60,000 tons
of .uranium but had only 20,000 tons either in hand or contracted for. This
was a short position which Westinghouse refused to acknowledge until July 14,
1975, and which represented a rather large shock to a market which is presently
producing about 13,000 tons per year and has capacity to produce between
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18,000 and 20,000 tons per year.
It is fairly easy to understand why Westinghouse would have found it
advantageous to act as a uranium agent for utilities buying its reactors
as well as for others willing to buy fuel fabrication services. Nuclear
energy was a new technology to the vast majority of the nation's utilities
in the early 1970 's. Since a commerical market for uranium really did not
begin to develop until 1969 or 1970, there were very few individuals who
had any expertise as uranium fuel buyers. The utilities themselves cer-
tainly had no expertise, and there was probably very little around to be
bought. It was only natural, therefore, for Westinghouse, interested in
marketing its reactor system, to act as a buying agent for utilities. By
acting as an agent for several firms Westinghouse presumably could accumulate
some expertise in dealing with suppliers, be able to make intelligent analyses
of the market and pool risks associated with uncertainties over exactly when
particular reactors would be operating. Utilities which might have been
hesitant to go with nuclear technology because of ignorance about the uranium
market and future prices might now be encouraged to do so once Westinghouse
was willing to guarantee supply at a fixed price. So it made good commercial
sense for Westinghouse to set itself up as an uranium buying agent. It might
also have been a more efficient buying arrangement than having each utility
develop fuel expertise on its own. The fact that utilities found the fixed
price contracts to be attractive is also not surprising since it eliminated
uncertainty at a relatively small premium and saved the utility the expense
of searching and contracting for uranium.
But why Westinghouse would sign fixed price contracts without also
securing associated uranium supplies is difficult to under-
stand. There does not appear to have been very much room for speculative
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profit in the uranium industry. It was generally acknowledged as early as
1971 that the direction of prices was upward and given that the industry in
the 1970-1972 period still remained slack with prices just covering extrac-
tion costs, there could not have been any real possibility of Westinghouse
profiting from a price break by going short. Yet by going short on fixed
price contracts, Westinghouse opened itself up to the possibility of fan-
tastic losses if uranium prices rose. So it appears that by going short
Westinghouse exposed itself to the possibility of large losses with no
possibility of speculative profits. At least at first glance, Westinghouse 's
policy of going short appears to be irrational. Westinghouse 's chief com-
petitor. General Electric, engaged in relatively little actual uraniixm con-
tracting in its fuel fabrication agreements and does not find itself in a
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position as serious as Westinghouse.
If Westinghouse 's "short" policy was a conscious, rationally thought
out policy, there are a nximber of things that might have helped lead to such
a policy. Westinghouse mght have hoped that the AEC would indeed release
its stockpile of uranium to the market at $8 per pound, providing sufficient
supply at low prices for several years. Alternatively, Westinghouse might
have hoped that once import restrictions were eliminated, cheap uranium
could be obtained from foreign sources. Finally, it is possible that
Westinghouse hoped to fill its remaining requirements from its own reserves.
If Westinghouse 's policy turned on these considerations, it was indeed a
high risk policy. The traditional AEC concern for protecting the domestic
mining and milling industry combined with vigorous opposition by the indus-
try to the AEC's marketing its uranium stockpile made such an occurrence
extremely unlikely. In any case this possibility was eliminated by December
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1972. Similarly, a very rapid elimination of import controls was unlikely
because of opposition from the domestic uranium industry. But perhaps more
importantly, the assumption that foreign uranium would be either easily
available or cheap is questionable. During this period of time Westinghouse
was engaged in vigorous activity to sell its reactors in a number of
foreign countries. Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France and other coun-
tries had fairly substantial nuclear programs under way by 1972, most of
which would require uranium from foreign sources. In addition, as discussed
above, a careful examination of the prices that the AEG had to pay during
the first expansionary phase to encourage entry should alone have raised
questions about the full economic cost of additional uranium mining and
milling capacity. If Westinghouse 's policy of signing fixed price con-
tracts while remaining short was a conscious policy, it was a risky one
with little prospect of large gains.
Given the extraordinary risk associated with Westinghouse's uranium
policy, one must at least raise the possiblity that it was not a well
thought out corporate policy, but in part evolved by accident. Of the total
of about 70,000 tons of uranium that Westinghouse committed itself to
deliver between 1966 and January 1, 1975, it appears that nearly half was
contracted for during 1973 and 1974. It appears also that prior to 1973
Westinghouse had contracted for delivery of at least 15,000 tons and perhaps as
much as 29,000 tons of U„0„. This means that a substantial portion of
J o
Westinghouse 's short position was accumulated during the two year period
of 1973 and 1974. Apparently, Westinghouse contracted to deliver nearly
as much uranium during these two years as it had during the past seven
years. It may have simply been that Westinghouse was slow to cover its
requirements and that it got caught when the prices began to rise rapidly
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in 1974. The possibility that careful scrutiny of the uranium situation
might not have been occurring is reinforced when we recognize that these
are the same years in which Westinghouse was facing serious cash flow
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problems and a rather substantial reorganization of the company.
Whatever the reasons for Westinghouse 's marketing behavior, it had
important implications for the uranium market as a whole. During the 1973
to 1974 period, Westinghouse was engaged in selling substantial quantities
of uranium to U.S. utilities but not covering these sales with supply con-
tracts. The 1973-1974 period was a critical time for the uranium mining
and milling industry, because it was during this period that timely addi-
tions of capacity would be necessary to meet uranium requirements effi-
ciently for the late 1970 's and early 1980 's. By "efficiently", I mean
providing additional supply at minimum costs and averting a possible abso-
lute supply constraint ( a corner) . Uranium supply from existing mines and
mills and those under construction is somewhat elastic in that low grade
ore can be mined and milled from existing reserves, but this increases the
cost per pound of U„0o dramatically. Westinghouse 's behavior exacerbated
J o
the failure of aggregate industry demand expectations to be matched by an
associated supply response because Westinghouse appears to have been a
very large part of the difference between "firm demand" and total aggregate
"expected demand". Since Westinghouse was itself engaged in uranium ex-
ploration and processing activity and owned substantial amounts of land
with potential uranium reserves, it was possible, prior to Westinghouse 's
announcement 5 that it itself would provide for its residual requirements.
By failing to reveal its true requirements in the market by securing uranium,
Westinghouse failed to give the necessary demand signals to get the market
prices moving toward long-run equilibrium during 1973-1974 as would have
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occurred if it had followed a policy of covering its requirements in a
timely fashion. As a result, when Westinghouse suddenly announced that it
was short 70 million pounds, the true gap between industry demand and supply
was finally revealed. This revelation may have pushed uranium prices above
the long-run equilibrium level reflecting the possibility that a minimum cost
supply response to demand expectations was impossible by 1980. The extent to
which Westinghouse may have distorted the market in this way depends on how
large a part of the industry short position it has for the period around
1980. We turn to this question now.
In Tables 14, 15, and 16, I present three alternative measures for
the proportion of the total gap between expected requirements and firm supply
commitments that was accounted for by Westinghouse. In Table 14 I compare
the reported unfilled requirements filed with the Atomic Enercy Commission
as of January 1, 1975. For the period 1979-1981 Westinghouse 's short posi-
tion is over 30 percent of the total short position for the industry. In
Table 15 estimates are presented based on the difference between ERDA and
NAC estimates of uranium requirements and reported commitments, without
allowing for reallocation of total industry inventories (that is, looking
only at flows for the industry but allowing Westinghouse to liquidate its
own inventory). Based on the ERDA estimates, Westinghouse 's share of total
industry shorts varies between 55 percent and 24 percent for the period
1979-1981. Based on the NAC estimates (which I believe are too high), it
varies between 16 percent and 26 percent. Table 16 uses the same data but
allows for complete inventory liquidation by the industry. Since at least
part of this inventory liquidation could occur only be transactions from
parties with excess supply to those with shortages, this comparison over-
estimates Westinghouse 's proportion of the shorts for years prior to total
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liquidation of excess inventories. Based on the NAC projections, we get the
same results as Table 15. Based on the ERDA projections, Westinghouse is
fully 100 percent of the industry shorts in 1980 and 24 percent in 1981.
The results reported in Tables 14 and 15 are probably the most useful.
They indicate that Westinghouse has a short position in the 1979-1971 period
that might be as low as 20 percent of total industry shorts or as high as
40 percent. Either number is quite large for an industry that was already
as early as 1972 acknowledged to be in a tight supply situation for the late
1970 's and early 1980 's. Since demand is very inelastic and since short-run
supply of total industry demand above 18,000 pounds is also extremely inelas-
tic, the gradual revelation that another 20 to 40 percent of uranium would in
fact have to be supplied could easily have driven the price of uranium up sub-
stantially. Since the price of uranium was already being driven up as other
uranium buyers were covering their position in 1973 and 1974, Westinghouse' s sud
revelation no doubt expanded the extent that firm demand was pushing on medium-
term supply capabilities. This kind of price response is not unique. In 1973
wheat prices rose dramatically when it was finally revealed that the Russians
had purchased substantial quantities of wheat on the U.S. market.
If Westinghouse had made timely purchases of uranium to match its
commitments and had not engaged in fixed price contracting that gave the
I
impression to others in the industry that they could get all the uranium
they needed at $8 to $10 per pound, prices for uranium would have begun to |
rise earlier than 1974 and probably would not have risen so far. If Westing-
house had contracted earlier, it would have become evident that additional
supply would only have been forthcoming at higher prices, and these prices
would have risen in the market. In addition, the supply sector would have
had another two years to adjust capacity to meet demand efficiently. It
- 63 -
appears that Westinghouse's own buying behavior probably affected both the
timing of the price rise and the levels to which prices finally rose.
Westinghouse's behavior appears to have had two types of undesirable
effects on resource allocation in the nuclear energy industry:
1. By helping to give utilities the impression that uranium would be
cheaper than it actually would be in long-run equilibrium (more on this
below), it encouraged overinvestment in nuclear generating facilities.
While it is often stated that uranium prices have an insignificant impact
.
on the overall economics of nuclear energy, Joskow and Baughman have shown
that a doubling of uranium and enrichment costs would reduce installed nuclear
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capacity by 25 percent in 1995. In addition, in a presentation before
the Connecticut Public Utilities Control Authority one utility showed that
the increased uranium price changed their decision to replace an oil-burning
plant with a nuclear plant and delayed the need for the nuclear plant by
104
two years.
2. Westinghouse's behavior helped to destort the efficient feedback
mechanisms that should have evolved to effectively link demand and supply
expectations and lead to appropriate price responses and a timely and effi-
cient response by the supply sector to expected uranium requirements. As
a result uranium prices in the near and medium terms will probably be higher
than they would have been with more timely additions to mining and milling
capacity.
Westinghouse's Request for a Discharge Under UCC 2-615
Westinghouse seeks to be excused from its contractual obligations under
UCC 2-615 on the grounds that the rise in uranium prices was caused by the
Arab oil embargo and the subsequent rise in oil prices, that this event was
unforeseeable, and that prices have increased so much that performance would
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be commercially "impracticable". In light of the discussion in Sections
II and III, let us proceed to evaluate Westinghouse's position.
1. Failure of underlying condition of the contract must occur.
Presumably the underlying condition that failed was the assumption
that the oil embargo and the subsequent use in oil prices which then led
to a rise in uranium prices would not occur. Westinghouse does not appear
to meet this requirement, because the only way the rise in oil prices could
have affected uranium prices would have been by increasing uranium demand
expectations through an increase in nuclear generating capacity. But I have
argued above that for a variety of reasons demand expectations for nuclear
generating capacity in the U.S. through the early 1990 's have fallen almost
continuously since 1970 and continued to fall after 1973. In addition,
foreign expectations have declined since 1973 as well. Any effect that oil
prices alone might have had on nuclear generating capacity has been over-
whelmed by other factors.
While the "OPEC argument" does not appear valid, let us be charitable
and allow that the change in enrichment criteria and problems with repro-
cessing and plutorium recycling might also be failures of underlying condi-
tions. But even when these factors are taken into account, expected uranium
requirements have certainly not increased since 1973, at least for the period
through the 1980 's.
It appears that the only underlying condition that Festinghouse might
reasonably claim has failed would revolve around the argument that uranium
suppliers have successfully cartelized the industry and artificially raised
prices. While I find this doubtful, the proper remedy would be through a
private antitrust action and not UCC 2-615.
I
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2. The failure must have been unforeseeable at the time the contract
was signed. Since the "OPEC" argument" does not appear to satisfy the
"failure" requirement, I will not try to argue whether it was foreseen or
foreseeable. In any case, in a recent federal court opinion the court
held that the events in the Middle East, at least as of 1972, were suffi-
ciently "foreseeable" that sophisticated agents should have included the
possibilities of increased prices and supply interruptions in the terms
of thexr contracts.
Under the circumstances let us allow a broader interpretation and ask
whether a rise in uranium prices, given prevailing expectations prior to 1974,
was either foreseen or foreseeable. I have already argued that an examination
of the demand projections and the commitments the supply sector was making for
future capacity were obviously inconsistent with one another in 1972 and 1973 for
the period beginning around 1979 and 1980, given the lead times required to bring
on additional mining and milling capacity, unless one believed both that the AEC
would dump its stockpile on the market and that all import restrictions would be
completely and rapidly eliminated and substantial amounts of low cost uranium
made available from foreign sources. This inconsistency was apparently recognized
by many in the industry. Numerous people familiar with the uranium industry
indicated that the supply picture and the demand picture would only be brought
into balance if prices rose and government policy regarding the disposition
of UoOq stock and imports was cleared up. Some people predicted a price
rise while others just spoke about tight markets developing throughout the
1972-1973 period. Since we cannot assume that all of the commentators were
well trained in economics, it is not at all strange that some planners spoke
of the tight market in terms of an emerging gap between quantities required
and supply capabilities at prevailing prices without translating this
into the need for a price increase. The question of actual
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price estimation required a detailed understanding of the costs of bringing
on new supply and the timing of that supply, both of which were highly
uncertain. That something had to give, whether it was price or demand,
was, I think, very clear by the beginning of 1973 and perhaps earlier from
an examination of the inconsistencies between demand projections and plans
for additional capacity. But a careful examination of the price data for
uranium transactions gives us even more reason to believe that well informed
entrepreneurs should have expected prices to rise once the industry moved
out of an excess capacity situation.
In the discussion above we indicated that prior to July 1975 real prices
of uranium were generally below the prices prevailing in the 1950 's, when
there was substantial entry into the industry. That prices would have to
rise to such levels once again to encourage entry into the industry would
only be surprising if one believed that the AEC paid prices far above what
was really necessary to encourage entry or that there had been important
cost reducing technological change. There does not appear to be any evi-
dence for either proposition and, if anything, tightening mining criteria
and reserve depletion have probably raised the real costs of uranium extrac-
tion. A buyer could, of course, have easily been fooled if he only looked
at prevailing market prices and AEC "cost" estimates in making his price
expectations. Uranium prices were indeed low for many years, reflecting
the excess capacity in the uranium industry. The forward cost system did
give misleading information about possible future uranium prices unless
used correctly. Westinghouse was willing to supply all comers at prices
between $8 and $10 per pound. But one would have thought that a large
buyer in the market, like Westinghouse, would have been more than a naive
price taker and would have done a more sophisticated analysis of price
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formation in the uranium market. After all, Westinghouse did commit itself to
deliver about 140 million pounds of uranium, Westinghouse had an additional
advantage; it knew that a large part of this commitment had not been con-
tracted for and that Westinghouse itself represented a huge hidden future demand
on the market. A price rise of some size was foreseen by many in the in-
dustry and should reasonably have been foreseeable by perhaps the largest
agent in the market, Westinghouse. I have been able to find no evidence
indicating that Westinghouse had, prior to late 1973, performed an extensive
analysis of uranium price behavior over the life of its contracts. Perhaps
if it had conducted such analyses, as it should have, it would have been
much more reluctant to sign the kinds of contracts that it did.
All things considered, it does not appear that Westinghouse satisfies
the "foreseeability" requirement either. To hold otherwise would encourage
suboptimal use of available information and the introduction of incorrect
price information into the process of exchange.
3. The risk of failure must not have been assumed either directly or in-
directly by the party seeking excuse. Recall that Comment 8 to UCC 2-615 indicates
that the allocation of risk to the party seeking excuse may be found in the
circumstances surrounding the contract as well as in the terms of the con-
tract. But the reason for many of the contracts was to convince utilities
to buy reactors from Westinghouse by performing a role as uranium buying
agent insuring them against fluctuations in the price of uranium. Why
would somebody buy a long-term fixed price contract other than to insure
against fluctuations in the price of uranium? The general commercial
reasons for signing long-term fixed price commodity contracts seems to
preclude excuse under 2-615 simply because the nature of this kind of
commodity contract implies the assumption of the risk of price fluctuations
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on the seller. The inherent uncertainties within the uranium market itself
associated with enrichment, reprocessing and recycling, foreign imports,
etc., were the reasons why utilities were attracted by the fixed price
contracts. To hold that the risks of such uncertainties were not implicitly
or explicitly to be borne by the seller seems to be inconsistent with the
intent and good sense of this requirement under UCC 2-615.
4. Performance must be impracticable. Even assuming that Westinghouse
satisfied the first three requirements, its case based on "impracticability"
due to the rise in costs is still unclear. The three- to fourfold increase
in prices is larger than the doubling, which clearly is not sufficient, and
smaller than the ten- to twelvefold increase that has been mentioned as
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being clearly enough. But to complicate the matter even more, many of
Westinghouse 's uranium contracts were written in conjunction with reactor
contracts. If we were to consider the total value of the contract, including
perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars for the NSSS and other components,
the increase in the cost of uranium would add a much smaller proportionate
cost to the total contract. Whether Westinghouse satisfies even the imprac-
ticability test is at best questionable.
5. The party claiming excuse must do everything possible to insure
itself of an adequate source of supply. Westinghouse 's problem arises from
the fact that it was short over 67 percent of its uranium commitments. It
could have covered these shorts in a timely fashion by purchasing U_0o for-
ward when it signed the sales contracts or by developing its own reserves
more quickly. Westinghouse gambled that its requirements could alternatively
be obtained from the market at a favorable price. It gambled (either con-
sciously or unconsciously) and lost. Westinghouse could have covered its
requirements by obtaining long-term supply commitments as it made sales of
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uranium. In fact, if it had engaged in more timely contracting, market
prices would have begun to rise more quickly as the market moved to a
long-run equilibrium. Westinghouse would probably have realized sooner
that the fixed price contracts it was signing would be unprofitable. The
common law cases underlying UCC 2-615 and subsequent cases under it cited
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above quite clearly indicate that under these circumstances a discharge
will not be granted and that for reasons of economic effi-
ciency such behavior should not be encouraged by the contract law itself.
6. The seller must not by his own actions create the event causing
the impracticiability of performance. Finally, it was argued above that
Westinghouse 's own behavior in the market had important effects on both
the time pattern of prices and the levels to which prices have now risen.
More timely contracting on Westinghouse 's part would have led to an earlier
supply response and ameliorated supply bottlenecks around 1980. By keeping
its requirements secret for so long and not "revealing" them to the market
by contracting for supplies, Westinghouse was a major contributor to the
failure of standard feedback mechanisms to signal the movement into a
new expansionary phase for the uranium supply sector. Westinghouse cer-
tainly fails to meet this wise requirement of the common law that has for
some reason been omitted from UCC 2-615.
The discussion in Section II concluded that the intent and current
interpretations of UCC 2-615 makes good sense in terms of its ability to
promote efficient bilateral exchange, by facilitating the contracting
processes and by providing useful guidance around the difficulties of
exchange aggrements, and to protect poorly represented individuals. At
least as currently interpreted, Westinghouse appears to fail on all counts
to justify a discharge of its contractual obligations under UCC 2-615.
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To hold otherwise would mean a major change In the interpretation of the
impracticability doctrine, serving to shift business risks ordinarily borne
by the sellers of the commodity to the buyers. The long-term effects of
such a decision would be to increase uncertainty in contractual relationships
involving an associated increase in transactions costs and impairment of
efficient market mechanisms. The increase in transactions costs would
accompany both the increased uncertainty associated with contracts of this
type as well as give disincentives to sellers to use the information available
to them to predict the likely course of commodity prices, to insure against
price fluctuations by including appropriate price adjustment mechanisms in
contracts, and to adopt efficient procurement policies. Buyers can, of
course, adapt to such behavior by sellers, but generally only through pro-
cedures which will increase the costs of exchange. Finally, a decision
in favor of Westinghouse would increase the uncertainty associated with
UCC 2-615 itself, leading at least in the short run to a substantial increase
in litigation and delays in performance on contracts. Neither economic
efficiency nor justice would be served by finding for Westinghouse.
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TABLE 1
PROJECTIONS OF NUCLEAR CAPACITY
GWe
1985 1995
AEC 1910-^ 300
AEC ig?!-"- (254-321)
AEC 1972^ 231-275 602-972
AEC 1974^ 256-332 620-960
FEA 1974^ 204
ERDA 1975^ 160-245 445-790
-Joskow (75)^ 190 552
FEA (76)"^ 142
Sources:
^ USAEC, WASH-1139 (70), p. 1, and WASH-1139 (Rev. 1), p. 2.
USAEC, WASH-1139 (72), p. 1 and p. 3.
^ USAEC, WASH-1139 (74), p. 2 and p. 8.
4 Federal Energy Administration, Project Independence Report
,
November 1974, p. 127.
Energy Research and Development Administration, unpublished
projections, February 19 75.
g Joskow and Baughman, "The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Energy
Industry", Bell Journal of Economics , Spring 1976,
p. 19. (Base case)
7 Federal Energy Administration, 1976 National Energy Outlook
,
February 19 76, p. 36.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED ANNUAL UEANIUM EEQUTREMENTS
Tons U^Og
r 1/1/73
AEC — ERDA
1/1/74 1/1/75 8/1/75 NAC
7/1/75
1973 9,100
1974 12,500 9,700
1975 16,500 11,700 10,800 8,500 10,154
1976 19,200 12,600 14,100 9,600 12,678
1977 21,700 16,000 17,500 16,400 19,049
1978 26,800 19,800 20,500 20,800 27,258
1979 31,200 25,200 23,200 22,700 31,627
1980 34,600 31,500 25,800 28,500 40,645
1981 39,900 35,000 30,800 35,700 46,086
1982 44,700 37,500 37,700 34,600 41,989
1983 50,400 39,800 41,800 37,600 42,041
1984 57,000 48,000 46,100 38,000 49,839
1985 64,500 57,200 50,900 37,000 52,635
Source: Kidder, Peabody Report, pp. 23-24
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TABLE 3
URANIUM DELIVERY COMMITMENTS
Annual Tons U^Og
as of
Jan. 1, 1974*
as of Jan. 1, 1975
1973 12,100
1974 13,700
1975 15,500
1976 10,900
1977 11,600
1978 13,200
1979 12,100
1980 10,200
1981 7,700
1982 6,600
1983 5,900
1984 4,000
1985 3,400
1986 1,700
1987-1994 <1,000
** Total
11,900 11,900
15,600 800 16,400
12,600 1,500 14,100
12,700 2,600 15,300
15,300 3,100 18,400
13,900 3,000 16,900
11,600 2,700 14,300
10,400 3,500 13,900
8,800 3,700 12,500
7,100 3,600 10,700
4,500 3,600 8,100
4,100 3,400 7,500
1,900 2,300 4,200
<l,200/year <2,000/year <3,200/year
Domestic sellers to domestic buyers.
** Imports
*- USAEC, WASH-1196 (74), April 1974, p. 4.
^ USERDA, ERDA-24, April 1975, pp. 4 and 8,
Inventory January 1, 1974: 19,900
Normal desired inventory of at least three months
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TABLE 4
REPORTED UNFILLED URANIUM REQUIREMENTS
Tons U^Oq
Total Reported by
Utilities and Vendors
1/1/74^ 1/1/75^
1974 100
1975 200
1976 600 1,000
1977 1,500 1,400
1978 5,100 6,600
1979 9,300 11,500
1980 15,300 18,800
1981 N/A 18,700
1982 N/A 22,500
Reported Unfilled Requiremen
as a Proportion of
Expected Requirements
J
1
61
60
1/1/74^ ~ % 1/1/75^ —
t
_%
1
—
2
5 7
9 8 I
26 32
37 50 1
49 60 1
USAEC, WASH-1196 (74), April 1974, p. 13,
USERDA,- -ERDA 24, April 1975, p. 13.
Based on Column 2, Table 2.
Based on Column 3, Table 2.
- 75 -
TABLE 5
URANIUM MILLING CAPACITY 1957-1975
Number of Mills Operating
(Yearend)
1957 16
1958 23
1959 24
1960 25
1961 26
1962 24
1963 21
1964 20
1965 16
1966 17
1967 16
1968 13
1969 15
1970 15
1971 17
1972 20
1973 18
1974 14
1975 15
* Unfortunately, estimates of U3O8 production capacity is reported
for only a few years. The relationship between column 2 and
yellowcake capacity depends on the ore grade of the rock and the
amount of ore left in the rock by the particular process used. In
1972 yellowcake production capacity was estimated at 19,000 tons
per year and at 18,000 tons per year in 1973. For 1970 and 1971
it was estimated at 15,000 to 16,000 tons per year. Since mills
operated near full capacity throught 1962, the figures given in
Table 10 for deliveries to the AEC are probably close to the
capacity levels of the mills.
Source: 1957-1973, Minerals Yearbook (Uranium Chapter).
1974, USAEC, GJO(100-75), p. 80.
1975, USERDA, GJO (100-76)
,
p. 80.
Capacity*
(Tons of ore per day)
11,000
21,000
22,000
22,300
22,500
22,000
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
23,450
26,450
27,500
31,900
28,450
25,450
23,000
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TABLE 6
AVERAGE U Og CONCENTRATION OF ORE DELIVERED
1951 0.31
1952 0.32
1953 0.31
1954 0.32
1955 0.30
1956 0.28
1957 0.28
1958 0.27
1959 0.26
1960 0.24
1961 0.24
1962 0.24
1963 0.25
1964 0.25
1965 0.24
1966 0.23
1967 0.20
1968 0.195
1969 0.21
1970 0.20
1971 0.20
1972 0.21
1973 0.21
1974 0.18
1975 0.17
Source:
1951-1971: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook , vol. 1,
1959-1971 (Chapter on Uranium)
.
1972-1975: USERDA, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry ,
January, 1, 1976, p. 86,
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE DEPTH OF EXPLORATORY HOLES DRILLED
(Feet)
1958 148
1959 146
1960 191
1961 160
1962 230
1963 104
1964 162
1965 187
1966 313
1967 425
1968 422
1969 428
1970 409
1971 401
1972 439
1973 480
1974 580
1975 482
Source: USERDA, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry
;
January 1, 1976, p. 56,
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TABLE 8
CONCENTRATION LEVELS IN URANIUM MILLING
Percent of Capacity
(tons of processed ore)
1967 1971
four firms 57.0 54.4
eight firms 78.7 78.5
sixteen firms 100.0 99.8
Source: Competition in the U.S. Energy Industry ^ Duchesneau,
p. 88.
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TABLE 9
U^Oo RECEIPTS BY DOMESTIC MILLS
i o
Tons
"3^8
1950 810
1951 1,088
1952 1,288
1953 2,315
1954 3,539
1955 4,425
1956 8,434
1957 9,837
1958 14,003
1959 17,377
1960 18,842
1961 18,513
1962 17,085
1963 14,721
1964 13,881
1965 10,578
1966 10,051
1967 10,866
1968 12,850
1969 12,595
1970 13,037
1971 13,089
1972 13,863
1973 13,787
1974 12,400
1975 12,000
Source;
1950-1973: USAEC, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry
^
January 1, 1974, p. 7.
1974-1975: USERDA, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry
,
January 1, 197 6, p. 10.
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TABLE 10
DELIVERIES OF U Og FROM DOMESTIC MILLS
Tons U^Og
To AEC To Commerical Buyers
1950 323
1951 639
1952 824
1953 968
1954 1,435
1955 2,125
1956 4,179
1957 7,505
1958 10,708
1959 15,029
1960 16,394
1961 17,646
1962 17,244
1963 15,752
1964 12,607
1965 11,240
1966 10,178
1967 8,902 900
1968 7,937 4,800
1969 7,124 4,200
1970 4,010 9,300
1971 1,295 12,700
1972 ~ 11,600
1973 ~ 12,100
1974 ~ 11,900
1975 — 12,500
Source: USERDA, Statistical Data on the Uraniuin Industry ,
January 1, 1976, pp. 11 and 78.
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TABLE 11
PROPERTIONS OF U-Og PRODUCTION FROM OPEN PIT
AND UNDERGROUND MINES
%
Open Pit Underground
16% 84%
21 79
25 75
26 74
19 81
38 62
34 66
39 61
25 75
28 72
28 72
25 75
30 70
24 76
29 71
31 69
30 70
37 63
42 58
46 54
54 46
59 41
63 37
59 41
56 44
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Source: USERDA, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry
,
January 1, 1976, p. 26.
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TABLE 12
Average Uranium Prices Per Pound U^Op
(1) (2) (3) (4)
$ $ $ $
1950 9.21 12.63
1951 10.01 12.62
1952 11.19 13.45
1953 12.30 14.49
1954 12.25 14.24
1955 12.51 14.20
1956 11.63 12.45
1957 10.53 10.68
1958 9.57 9.57
1959 9.25 9.01
1960 8.75 8.41
1961 8.47 8.02
1962 8.00
1963 8.00
1964 8.00
1965 8.00
1966 8.00
1967 8.00
12/31/68 6.50
12/31/69 6.20
12/31/70 6.20
12/31/71 5.95
12/31/72 5.95
6/73 6.50 3.57 3.21 2.86
12/73 7.00 3.72 3.35 2.98
6/74 10.50 5.25 4.73 4.20
12/74 15.00 7.08 6.37 5.66
5/75 21.00 9.63 8.67 7.70
8/75 26.00 11.87 10.68 9.50
12/75 35.00 15.84 14.26 12.67
(1) Nominal Price Per Pound U^Og
(a) 1950-1967 AEC purchases (U.S. ERDA, Statistical Data on
the Uranium Industry , January 1"^ 1976, p. 11.
)
(b) 1968-1975 Spot Market Price (NUEXCO Reports)
(2) Real Prices Deflated by GNP Structures Index
(3) Equivalent Real Prices Adjusted for 10% Depletion
(4) Equivalent Real Prices Adjusted for 20% Depletion
(5) Equivalent Real Prices Adjusted for 30% Depletion
- 83 -
TABLE 13
WESTINGHOUSE POSITION IN URANIXJM MAI^KET"
as of January 1, 1975
Westinghouse Commitments 1975-1988
Westinghouse Inventory Jan. 1, 197 5
Westinghouse Purchase Agreements 1975-1988
Westinghouse Short 1975-1988:
60,084 tons U^Og
5,896 tons U^Og
14,075 tons U^Og
40,113 tons U^Og
In addition General Electric is short 5,000 tons for the
period 1982-1984.
Kidder, Peabody Report, p. 8
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TABLE 14
WESTINGHOUSE'S SHARE OF UNFILLED URANIUM REQUIREMENTS
Tons U-Og
Total Reported by
Utilities and Vendors
1/1/74 1/1/7 5
1974 100
1975 200
1976 600 1,000
1977 1,500 1,400
1978 5,100 6,600
1979 9,300 11,500
1980 15,300 18,800
1981 N/A 18,700
1982 N/A 22,500
Westinghouse Short*
1/1/75 as % of Total**
3,199 28%
6,768 36%
5,302 28%
4,930 22%
includes liquidation of 4,800 tons of Westinghouse '
s
5,900 ton inventory on 1/1/75.
**This assumes that Westinghouse accurately reported its
own short position in the AEC survey.
Source: Table 4 and Kidder, Peabody Report, p. 8.
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TABLE 15
DERIVED UNFILLED REQUIREMENTS
(Without Inventory Liquidation by Industry)*
Tons U^0„
Westinghouse
ERDA (8/1/7 5) NAC (7/1/7 5) tons % ERDA % NAC
1977 1,100 3,749
1978 2,400 8,858
1979 5,800 14,727 3,199 55% 22%
1980 14,200 26,345 6,768 48% 26%
1981 21,800 32,186 5,302 24% 16%
1982 22,100 29,489 4,930 22% 17%
1983 26,900 31,341 4,169 15% 13%
1984 29,900 41,739 3,983 13% 10%
1985 32,800 48,435 3,777 12% 8%
*Westinghouse is assumed to run down its inventory to 1,100
tons. Inventory ifor the rest of the industry is not
liquidated.
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TABLE 16
DERIVED UNFILLED REQUIREMENTS
(With Inventory Liquidation)
*
Tons U^Og
Westinghouse
ERDA (8/1/7 5) NAC (7/1/75) tons % ERDA % NAC
1975 — —
—
1976 -- —
1977 — —
1978 — —
1979 14,727 3,199 100% 22%
1980 5,496 26,345 6,768 100% 26%
1981 21,800 32,186 5,302 24% 16%
1982 22,100 29,489 4,930 22% 17%
1983 26,900 31,341 4,169 15% 13%
1984 29,900 41,739 3,983 13% 10%
1985 32,800 48,435 3,777 12% 8%
*Assuines inventory of 1/3 annual requirements maintained,
T-'tq-'^i-t^- ' i
Hvax Had aaniHo iaa^ io SMoniiiAi
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